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OHAPTER I
THE MORALITY OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE ACCORDING TO THUCYDIDES
~~IOU ydp ~' 4pl~~' 4~oa(vu~al Idp~ox«

dvlpo"

e3~'

Zeu'

4v ~'v x«~d OOUA&OV ~~«p lAnolV •
..... OdZ •••l' 17. 322-32.3.

When the Greek world emerged trom its dark age. about the
middle ot the elghth century betore Ohrist, ahe was dotted with
many small clty atates up and down her coast. and In the interior
lands surrounding the Aegean.

The sun ot those wldely ruling

monarchs whose heroic deeds Homar had sung bad already set beneath
the political horizon.

A

~lad

ot tiny 1ndependent po11t1es had

risen in its plaoe and would dominate the h1stor1oal scena tor
some oenturies to come.
Despite thetr ins1gnifioant size, theae po11t1cal bod1ea
managed to produoe one of the truly great civ1lizationa of the
human race.

W1th their intense mi11tary and oommero1al r1valry,

they planted colon1es from one end ot the known world to the
other--trom Slnope on the Ruxine to Balinua 1n Slcl1y.

And,

though they were contlnually at war with one another, still they
provided within their midst a spawning ground for some of the
tinest artists, writers, and thtnkers ot all tlme--men 11ke Plato,
Ph1di.s, P1ndar.

H.rodo~u ••

Sophocles, Aeschylus, Demosthenes,

Polygnotul, Aristophanest Socrates, and Thucydides.
One dominant note runs tlwoughout these centuries of Greek
greatnesst the jealously guarded b •. eueepta., whioh we frequently
translate "freedom."

This was the distinctive trait of the city

state and of its people.

As an ideal, it inspired the polity to

aSlert its own independent claim to greatness and inspired the
individual c1tizens to reach out tor an acme of culture in all
fields.

And later, when Greek ingenuity was becoming exhausted;

it would serve as the tragio flaw that would destroy their civilisation through. improvident internal dissension.

But now. in

the fifth century, the era with which we shall be concerned,

e>..tuetp{a. expressed in one word the spirit of the times.
It 1s important for us, then, it we wish to understand the
temperament of this Greek people, that we know precisely what
their trad1tional spirit embodied.

The word f>..eugepla., as we have

remarked, can be translated briefly as "freedom" or ttin4-ependence."
But it meant much more to the Greeks.

It embraced not merely the

concept ot political autonom¥, though this was an important factor
1n itself.

Nor d1d it necessarily signify that a citizen governed

hi.maelt bJ' a more or less democI"atic torm of goveI"nm.ent.
it meant that in the way the oity state was

Rather

go~erned-.whether

oligarohy, tyranny, or democI"acy•• the rights of the individual
were respected.

Each man was a full-fledged member of his state,l

•• •

lNot all adult malee. ot oourse, were citizens in the Indi.
vidual .tates, but only those who possessed the proper birth and
property qualifications.

.3
not Just a subject

Oa!'

IIlave ot the pollty_

both. the 111t8matlonal autonomy
and the domostlc pollcT. where

01'

oltlaen.

external Hlations c.t a atate

apblt~

in favor of a polity ruled hi la••

'!'hua lllueep(a. included

governm$nt was excluded

~.$pectlng

the dlgn1t1 ot eaoh

a.neela one all.. embt-aolng apUttt nx-e tound both ..

stimulant tor and a satlafaotlon ot man'. higher lnatincta and
oapabl11tl.....1n

~•• dol1l

ot opportunity and in

r&a~ot

tor the

achieve.nt. ot the lndlvldual. 'both In the oa8e ot state. and

men-a
!hi. tradition ot cleue.p/a. ...

and bearts ot tn. Gr••k pGOple.
stood for. they bad tought

tl~7

embedded 1n the minda

To pH .." . It and all that lt

nwaeN'WI wa.t-s

as.1nat domestto despots

and. against otbel' oity atat•• whlch had, sought to enol'Oaoh on

thetr libertiea.

ID the opening year. of the fifth

the bubarlan armi••

tl"Olfl

'eraia had

oY.r~

o.nt~,

thel!' land, t11.

when
G~eek

people had .tood tog.th•• to waN o£t the eWead _nac. of 6oule{CI..

1fIbleb. waa tbJ.'l6aten1ns to engulf the whole
•

".

•

• J

•

•

•

or Hell.a• .3

POll'gett1ng

• • • • •_

..
J;,oUAllo., wh10h 1s utruall,. tl'8nalated a.s "alavery" oX' ttenw
al.av_t. b ~.al17 considered .a the. opposite of 4AI\1elplu.
Gonte%' "'''itt,
Atha9&!D ~b!!t'\ Meta, 1n 'the place 01".4 a
.ape.taU,. pap
.•

4
their individual differenoes in the face ot a threat to their
dearly prized freedom. they had battled the foreigh invader in
unison.
Against the background ot this weighty traditIon, Athens
arose a fe. years later and enslaved over half the Greek world.
~ranstorm1ng

the original naval confederacy of Delos into an

Athenian Emplre,4 sbe acted oontrary to all that had been held
saored in Hellas up to that time.
poured forth in abundance by the

Righteous indignation was
treedo~lovlng

Greeks against

this moral abomination; and, to relieve the oppressed states, an
international war was inaugurated which wauld drag on for twentyseven yeus.
To Thucydides, the supposedly abJe.ct1v. historian of the
Athenian Empire, this oontradiction cried tor a solutIon. how
could any sincerely religious Greek people rise to succeas by enslaving the1r tellow Hellenes?

~o

reconoile this seem1rlg d1 .....

parity, he returned to the question ot a moral Justifioation tor
the Athenian Empire several times during his narratlve. 5 But he
dId not push his inquiry openly or in his own name, because his
•

40Ur present notion ot empire was perhaps too refined for the
ancient Greek. 'ApX~ was the term employed to deSignate the Athe~
nian power. Its real meaning ean be ascertained it we advert to
the fact that it was the active concept corresponding to the passive OouA£lc and hence took away ~A.£ua£pia.. Confer de Romilly,
ibid., 19-20.

-

$B,g., I, 15-71J II, 60-64; v, 8$-111; VI, 82-81,

a few of the more prominent places.

to mention

5
work was supposed to be a striot chronologioal retailing of

even~

Rather he pursued his InvestigatIons through his charaoters, let-ting their

V&l~ious

speeohes speak tor

h~-the

Spartans and their

allies as the prosecutors. the Athenians as the defendants.

This

method for proposing the argUments tor both sides has left us,
throughout the books of Thucydides. moral accusations and apologi.,
as in abundance) but it has also lett us wondering what the personal opinIons of Thuoydldes were in the matte~~
This limitation. namely our not being able to assign 8.r!1

statements definitely to Thucydides on the morality of the Athenian Empire. forces us to proceed to our goal in this thesis in a

roundabout way.

In our treatment of Thucydldean passages where

a justifioation tor the Empire ls attempted, we must carefully
distinguish between Thucydldes and the Athenian slde as presented
by--and not necessarily subscribed to by--Thucydides.

What will

this distinction mean practically in our present oonsiderat1on?
Simply that we must be oontent at first w1th skimm1ng the surface
of the text, confining ourselves to the Athenian observations on
the morality

ot their empire.

Later,. when we ,halre t};tlly grasped

the import of the Athenian position, we can attempt to determine
whether or not the position 1s also Thucydides'.
Theretore, keeping in mind the dominEnt tradition ot

~Aeo

e&p{a in the fifth century and the peculiar, reoondite condition

of the historian in the present context, let us commence our
study of the morality ot that oontradiotion which history has

6
labelled the Athenian Empire.

Perhaps the most oonoise statement

on behalf ot Athens is oontained in the first book of Thuoydides.
beginning in ohapter seventy.tive.

Here some Athenian oitizens,

who happened to be in Sparta on business in 432 when the ohiet
oouncil ot the Lacedaemonians was debating whether or not to declare war against Athens, sum up in brief compass their apologia
tor their empire:
• • • do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive
jealousy by the Hellenes just on account or the empire
.e possess? And indeed we did not aoquire this empire
by toroe, but only atter you had retused to continue to
oppose Yb.at was lett 01' the barbarian toroea, and the
allies came to us and of their own aooord asked us to
aasu.m.e the leadership. It waa under the oompulsion of
oiroumstanoes that we were driven to advance our .~
pire to 1ts present state, influenoed chiefly by tear,
then by honor also, and lastly by self-interest as well;
and atter .e had onoe inourzaed the hatred 01' most 01'
our allies, and several ot them had already revolted
and been reduoed to subjeotion, and when you were no
longer friendly as before but suspioious and at va.rianee with us. it no longer seemed sate to risk relaxing our hold. For all seoeders would have gone over
to you. And no man is to be blamed for making the-most
01' his agvantages when it is a question of the gravest
dangers.
This short, blunt paragraph is the Athenian case.

Other

passages may introduce ramitioations ot the ideas here expre$sed.
but they add nothing to the essential simplicity of this argument.

We shall rely on it for our po1nt ot departure, bringing

in other texts only where neoessary to ola rlty expressions not
fully developed.

61•
this thes
serles.

lS.8 will
l-~. The translation of Thuoydides used throughout
be that at Charles Forster Smith from the tOGh

7
This justifioation falls easily into a threefold division,
based on ohrono1ogical as well as logioa1 oonsiderations.

At its

inoeption, the Athenian Empire was not aoquired by force; but the
allies of Athens freely and of their own aocord asked her to as-

sume control of the naval oonfederacy at Delos.

Seoondly, al-

though this oonfederacy was at the time a far cry trom the later
Empire, yet the

g~adual

transition from confederacy to Empire was

effeoted only under compulsion of circumstances.

Henoe the Athe-

nians inourred no guilt in this transitional stage.

And then,

finally, when Athens was faced with the harsh reality of the

E~

pire in its full vigor, it was no long$r safe for her to relax
her grip.-th1s would have been political suioide.

Thus the Athe-

nians, through no fault ot their own, had oome into the possession

ot this moral monster.7
The tirst of the exouses proftered by the Athenians,:ram.elYI
that the original oommand ot the De1ian contederacy was'not se-

I

cured by force, is a fact of history, valid as far as it "gpes.
But its direct bearing on the case is minimal.

The allies sub-

mitted to a confederacy on equal terms, not relinquishing their
soveX'eignty in the least--a11 of this in complete accord with

7It i8 noteworthy that the Atheni,ans in the course of the
book never attempt to claim that their empire 1s entirely just.
Perioles himself adm1ts to the Athenians tp,at "the empire you
hold 1s a tyranny" (II, 63, 2). Rather their efforts to justify
their aotions are always in terms ot oiroumstanoes,' 'inot the deeds
themselves.

8
their tradi tional
stage of what

w~s

~Ae\)eep( a..

No one woul'd claim that the io1 tial

later to prove the Empire was unjust; and Athens

is by her first assertion simply beginning on the rIght foot
rhetorically by stat1ng an obvious fact with which her audience
will undoubtedly agree.

Thus this excuse in itself does not

amount to a moral Justification of the Athenian Empire. but merely to a re .... assertion of the original innocuous nature ot the power
held by the Athenians.
The next point of the Athenian defense. namely the

transi-'~

tton trom oontederacy to empire because of the presa ot olrcunt-fl
stances, would seem to be the orux ot the question.

~l

For here, In

the gradual evolution to imperial power, the rights of the allies
began to be intringed upon and
significance to be rejeoted.
forced

(XCL'tT)VCLyxciaew.cv]

~Ae\)eep{«

1n its true po11ttcal

If the Athenians were actualll

to take t.his course ot action, then any

olaas of immorality could hardly be proved against them.

But,

it they were not striotly forced 1nto these aot1ons, their apologia becomes invalid; and they stand convioted as impious.
point on which their whole case rests is the necessity of
stances.

The
clro~

It such necessity was really present and only If it was

really present, oan their mode of conduot be justified.
The third point of the apologia 18 fundamentally a

2os~

faotWll argument: given the Athenian Empire, what can we do with
it?

Again a form ot neceSSity, here the need tor

steps in and d1etate. that the

'pX~

be held onto.

selt-preservat1~

It Is now too

9
dangero~s

to let go.

Th1s would allow tormer subjeots to release

their pent-up hatred against the Athenians} and Athens, deprived
of her tormer armor, would be surrounded on all sides by enemies
eager to taste her blood.

The torce of this final point also rests on the evidenoe of
oircumstanoes.

Everyone listening to the Athenian envoys would

be willing to concede that th.1.s third point, like the first one,
1s undeniably true.

Athens was sitting on a powder keg and could

not aftord to get off.

Hence, from the Athenian pOint of view

at least, necessity was once agein forcing their hand.

They had

no desire to run roughshod over the moral traditions of their
people, but they had no choice.
And so the Athenian case seeW,& to hang together rather solidly.

Charges of immorality are hemmed in on all sides by the blank

wall of necessity.

And this necessity, in at least the first and

third points of the Athenian apologia, is supported by ihoontestable evidenoe.
But, as Thucyd1des himself realized. this case is not on so
ti~m

a foundation as may appear at first glance.

When one in-

speots somewhat more closely the nature of the necessity adduoed
as excusing. the moral validIty of the Athenian justification begins to topple.

Let us take another look at the exact wording

of some portions of the above-quoted speech to the spartan oouncil:
It was under the compulsion ot circULwtances that we

10

were driven to advanoe our empire to its present state,

influenoed chiefly by fear, then by honor also, and
lastly by selt-interest as well; and after We had onoe
inourred tho hatred of most of our allies • • • it no
longer seeme~ safe to risk relax1r-g our hold • • • •
And no man is to be blamed for making the most of his
advan~ages when it is s. que~tlon of the gravest dangers.

Are the Athenia.ns here talking of necessity or of expediency?
would seem trom their very words--honor, self-interest J

It

advan+-~

that a large part of wha.t they are oalling necessity is in fact
simply pragmatio neoessity or expedienoy.

Thus it would appear

that the Athenians were not foroed in the strict sense ot the
term. but rather swayed by considerationa of gain and loss. as
they themselves here seem to admit.

Hence their necessity is

not what we would ea.ll true moral necessity, and their attempt
to justify their aations 1s to this extent based upon an unsolid
foundation.
At this point in our argument, however, a whole new area
in Thucydides is opened to view.

ForJ in the pages of his history

we find not just faots and not just a thinly veiled spologia for
the Empire. but also a complete new soheme of morality on whioh
the justification can be based.

Onoe again, we cannot pos1tively

state that Thuoydides personally held this new morality. but only
that he puts its prin.ciples into the mouths of the spokesmen for
the Athenians.

On the basis of this new morality, the neoessities

or expedienctes mentioned abOve beoome valid apologias for the

11

rectitude of the dpX~.
Though this thesia is not primarily philosophical in character, it will be helpful to consider quite brietly what the Thueydidean/or rather Athenian tenets ot morality were.

First ot all,

the toundation stone ot the new morality was human nature. not
human nature as it ought to be. but human nature as it ls.

Thus

the strong natural motives inherent in the human being were canonized and morality put on a positivist toundation.

Thus, when the

Athenians built up their Empire because ot tear, honor, and gain,
they were but yielding to the universal necesaity ot this human
nature I xp~od~evo, ~n dv9p~e(q ~dOt,.9 And they were blameless
in such action because "nothing is remarkable or inconsistent with
human nature in what .e have done."lO
The oardinal prinoiples ot this existential human nature
seem to have been: "no man is to be blmed tor making the most ot
his advantages when there is a question ot the gravest dangers n1l
and "it i8 always the established rule that the weaker is kept
down by the stronger."12 Thus we find the Athenians in 416 exhorting the Melians not to urge the old hypocritical claims of

9I, 76, 3.

76, a.
llI, 7$, 5.
12I, 76, 2.
1°1,
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morality and justice13._"which no one, when opportunity offered
of seouring something by main strength, ever yet put before toroe
and abstained from taking advantage. ,,14 The Athenians wanted to
base their mores on more realistic oonsiderations. l $
It is not the aim ot this thesis to refute the philosophical
foundation ot this argument.

But it has been necessary to see

why we oan term the Athenian apologia a moral justification in
the true sense.

Granted the revised oonception of moral neoessity

the Athenian defense can beoome valid in the moral order.

We

shall prescInd, therefore, from any philosophical discussion of
its posItIvist basis and ask: is 1t valid in the moral order?
By posIng our question in this way, we pass from the philosophioal realm to that of historical and literary tact.

Was there

present in the ooncrete ciroumstances surrounding the development
of the Athenian Empire trom the naval confederaoy at Delos a
13v, 89-90.

141, 76,

2.

15Thl• moral theory is not deduoed from isolated instanoes
in the text. Many passages besides
75-77 and the others oited
express similar opinions--e.g., III, 45 and 82-85, IV, 61; v, 85111) VI, 82.87. Confer also Paul Shorey, "On the Implicit Ethios
and Psychology of Thuoydides,u Transagtlons ot the American Philological Association, XXIV (18~l', 6 -SS, a!though 'thIs artTOIe
seems In places to overstep the limits of the evidence and also
assigns opinions directly to Thucydides which should be more
properly reterred to his charactera. To see how aocurately Thucydldesdesor1bes the current moral standards of much of Athens,
confer Paul F. Conan, 8.1., The Ultimate Norm ot Mora1itz in ~he
Trasedies ot Sophocles, (UnpUEIisned laster's !nesla; toyoTa--Un!verslty;-CElcago, !954), espeoially Chapter II, pp. 7-25.

I,
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necessity which forced the Athenians to take the course ot action
that they did?

Or was this necessity merely a product of the

mind ot the Athenian Thucydides, who has gilded his

nal~~ative--

as Corntord and others charge--omitting certain tacts to establish
his thesis ot necessity and, as a consequence, the actual validity
of the moral justification?
This, then, is the problem of our thesis.

Is the Thucydidean

apologia for the Athenian Empire valid in the light of history?
Was necessity such as he portrays really present in the adjacent
circumst~~ces;

or did he exercise his critical

jud~nt

to avoid

mentioning embarrassing events which would dislodge his preconceived conclusion?

In other words, 1s Thueydides good history in

this conneotion; or was he indulging in a literary fantasy and
shaping the facts to soothe the downhearted Athenians after the
fall of their oity?16
•

We will have no little difficulty in answering this question.
Almost all succeeding historians of hlus period have utilized

16That the historian wrote after 404 B.C. and the fall ot
Athens is attested to by his words in V, 26. 1, where ~e refers
to the twenty-seven year duration of the PAlopo~~esian War.
I wish to aoknowledge my indebtedness to the following works
for helping me to formulate the problem or this thesis: Francis
MaoDonald Cornford, ThUCjdideS ~th1stor1ous (London, 1907);
David Grena, Man in ftIs rIae ( ieago, 19>0), especially pp. 369: de Rom11ly, tbrd:;-Uaurioe Hutton. "Thucydides and Hi8tory,rt
Proceed1nss and !ransactions of the Rozal Soc1et~ ot Canada, 3rd
SerIes, ! (1~), Section fr,~2;:245.
---

Thucydides as their chier source.

Hence they oould hardly be ex-

pectod to serve as oriteria tor his objeotivity.

And,

unfortuna~

1y, the work ot Thuoydides is the only literary historioal reoord

of the times in question. 17

Henoe, to verity Thucydides f objec-

tivity on the matter of the Athenian Empire, we must turn to some
other non-literary historical source.
For this source, I have chosen the Greek coinage ot the
period, issued by the various cities subjeot to imperial Athens.

The scienoe of numismatics has proved peculiarly valuable in
other instances tor giving continuous, unbiased inSights into the
history of a people. 18

The emblems on the ooins can tell us some-

thing ot the ruling class in the state at the time; the monetary
standard employed in striking the metal pieces can reveal something of the

cor~~rcia1

relations ot the city; and even a laouna

in a well-authenticated series can sometimes indicate to the ob17Namely 480-411. There are, of course, certain chroniclers
(conter Felix Jacoby,AtthisJ OXford, 1949) and also a slight
overlapping in the accounts ot Herodotus and or Xenophon, not to
mention oooasional hints by Aristophanes, but nothing oontinuous
or sustained. Plutaroh. who also treats of many ot these years
in his iiV~S, relies heavIly, but not completely, upon the Thueydidean ex.
lBscholars have been greatly indebted to the work of Seltman,
who revolutionized our knowledf~ or Athenian history from the
years 594-561 a tew decades ago tbrOU~l his tireless research
with coins. There are also other examples of history beine aided
through numismatIcs, among the more reoent of these might be included the work of May on the coins ot Aenos and that ot Head on
the earliest coins ot BoeotIa. We will have occasion later in
the thesis to reter to these latter works in our diSCUSSion ot
the history or these areas.
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server a temporary loss of

sovereigil~Y

or some s1l1lilal'" political

calamity.

n~~smatlos

may be able to throw some

Thus I hope the

light on our present subject, namely the necessity attenc1.ant on
the formation and continuance of the Athenian :Bm:pire.

Coins and finanoial records, at' coul"sa, cannot 'Gel1 us the
whole story.

But the oontinuous and faithful aocounts that they

have left us in many instances point up an objective historioal
narrative to which we can compare Thucydides for conformity.

For

example, if' we can glean from this archaeological source certain
salient historical fac'cs ",hioh Thucydidea should have knoW!), and
should have ineorpol"ated into his history, then we may leg'iti.m.ate-

ly ask why he made such an omission--especially it the facts in
question might have some bearing on the justification of the
Athenian Empire and the necessity connected with it.

And, if we

can find through our investigations no such telling omissions,

then we may have added substantiation for the Thuoydidean apologis
from

Ell

other historioal field.

Our purpose, then, in the next four chapters of this thesiS
will be briefly to review the main faots of history touohing on
the Athenian Empire in the years that Thucydides' narrative cover,
~ly

from 478 to 411.

We shall use as our basic skeleton the

texts of Thucydides dea.ling with the growth and maturity of' the

empire; and we shall comment on and fill in with evidence from
nunlisIttatics wherever possible.

In this way we may hope to a.p-

proach. all objective view of the history of these years and of'

16
the Athenian Empire in general.

For the moment then, in chapters

two through five, we shall presoind trom all oonsiderations of
morality and oonfine ourselves to a perusal of the two accounts
of history.

In the final chapter, we will once again return to

our problem and, in the light ot the history seen, attempt some
conolusions on the objective validity ot the Thucydidean apo1og1a. 19
19It is difficult in suoh stUdies as these to promise a full
solution to our problem. We may merely hope that our searoh may
be profitable in pointing out the general direotion of an answer.
We do not expeot a definitive. black-and-white proof statement
that Thuoydides was highly biased in his treatment ot the Empire
or that he was completely ObJective in his writings, we will be
much more likely to uncover a more generic tendency towards
either subjectivity or objectivity.
We may al so in our last chapter add some few words on the
question whether or not the contemporary Athenian code of morality
was actually shared by Thuoydides.,.

OHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN EfiIPIRE:

In the sp~lng of the year

in their newly found power.

478

B.C •• the

478-454

G~eeks

B.a.

were exulting

They had eftectively treed the main-

land in the preoeding August, when they had roundly trounced the
Persian invaders at Plataea and at Mycale.

Then, during the win-

ter months, the Athenian fleet had opened up the Dardanelles to
Greek navigation by capturing Sestos.

And now, an armada of Greek

allies under Spartan leadership was preparing to set sail tor
Cyprus to expel the Persian gar:risons trom the Greek oit"ies on
that island.
At this time the Spartan hegemony in Greeoe was an a.ccepted
tact.

Sparta, largely because ot her naturally military mode of

lire, had been the on11 first-rank military

po\Ye~

in Greece at

the time ot the Persian invasion and, as a consequence, had assumed a more than generous portion ot the fighting and adminis•

trative roles in the Greek resistanoe.

Just recently, in

479,

it had been her general, Pausanlas, a member ot the royal family

17

of Sparta, who had engineered the brilliant victory at Plataea.
It surprised no one, then, that the spartan ephors selected the
same Pausanias to head the combined fleet of more than sixty
allied vessels on the Cyprus campaign.
The Cyprus expedition under Pausaniaa triumphed within an
amazingly short time.

So the fleet sailed north and took Byzantium before the close of the summer. l These, in addition to his

previous suooesses, turned the head of PausaniasJ and he began
to entertain grandiose thoughts of making himself ruler of the
whole Greek world.

Though still Greek commander-in-chief, he

adopted the external trappings of an oriental potentate--wearing
eastern dress, observing Persian customs, and surrounding himself
with a personal bodyguard seleoted from the Persian and EgyptIan
prisoners taken at Byzantium.

He gradually grew more and more

insolent and oppressive towards the Greek officers under him.
Finally, to make the situation thoroughly

intole~able,

he

Initia~

a treasonable correspondenoe with Xerxes himself, in whioh he

offered to help him overeome Greeoe.
At this point, the ephors began to grow alarmed at the

various reports reaching them from the Hellespont.

So they

summoned Pauaanias baok to sparta in the fall of 478 to stand

lIt is impossible to substantiate this early tall of Byzantium from its coinage because the city did not begin 1ssuing
either her iron or silver currency until the clos1ng years of the
fifth century. Conter Barclay Vincent Head, ~1storia Numorum.
2nd edt (Oxford, 1911), pp. 266-267.
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trial on the charges accumulated against him.

In the official

investigation which ensued, some of the lesser acousations against
him were proved; but the more serious oount ot treason was not.
At any rate, he was removed from command, but allowed to return
to Byzantium in an unofficial capacity in the following sprIng. 2
This scandal, following as it did soon after the disgrace of
another Spartan general, Leotychldas, who had mismanaged the

co~

bined Thessalian offensive in the previous year,3 sowed the seeds
of discontent among the non-Peloponnesian allies.

And

~~,

dur-

ing the absence of Pausanlas, some ot the Ioniana suggested that
the group appoint a new, non-Doric leader.

The proposal was

well reoeived by the majority ot tho aruy, most of whom were
either Attic or Ionian; and an Athenian general was seleoted, who
agreed to

se~e

as supreme oommander.

Thus, in the sprIng of 477, when the new general sent out
by the Spartans arrived, he tound the Athenian leadership an aofr

oompllshed taot.

SuprIs1ng1y enough, he made no great protest

aSouroes for thIs treatment of Pausanias and his management
of the Spartan hegemony are Thucydides, I, 94-95. Herodotus, V, 32
and VIII, 3. Bury, 322-326, The Cambr1dge Anoient HistorI. Edited
by J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook t ~F: !. AdoooK, Vol. ~: "Athens, 478401 B.C." (New York, 19271. 33-39J R. Wei1, "Das Mun~recht dar
BYKMAXOI 1m eraten Attisohen Seebund," Ze1~sohrift ~ Numiamat1!,
XXVIII (1910), 351-364.
3The venalIty of some Spartan leaders when they esoaped from
the imposed trugality of theIr home l1fe is notorious. Sparta
allowed her people the use of only iron money, forbidding them
gold and silver. But obviously alle did not extirpate all their
latent desires for the finer metals.
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over this turn of events.

Sparta, essentially a land power, was

generally oontent as long as her affairs were not menaced on the
pelopoIDlese and was growing tired of the prolonged sea campaign
abroad.

So she and the rest of the Peloponnesians used this as

an exouse for a quiet withdrawal, thus unconsoiously setting the
stage for the future triumphs of Athens.
After the departure of the Peloponnesian forces, Athens and
her al11es carried on the campaign against the Persians by
selves.

the~

It was at this point that there came into being the

Delian confederaoy--that organization whioh was later to blossom
forth into the Athenian Empire.4

Thuoydides desoribes its birth

in this fashion:
After the Athenians had sucoeeded in this way to
the leadership over the allies, who freely ohose them
on aooount of their hatred of Pausanias, they assessed
the amount of their contributions, both for the states
whioh were to furnish money for the war against the
Ba:r-barians and for those ltlioh were to furnish. ships,
the avo.ed objeot being to avenge t hemselvea for wh"at
the:' had sutfered by ravaging the King's te:r-ritory.
And it waa then that the Athenians f1:r-st establIshed
the office of Hellenio treasure:r-s, who reoeived the
tribute, tor so the oontribution of money waa termed.
The amount of the tribute first assessed was four
hundred and sixty talonts, and the treasury of the
allies ~as Delos, where the meetings ware held in the
temple.>

4The date of the formation of the Delian confederacy is disputed. It probably took place sometime between the winter of
478/7 and the following summer. Confer the chronologioal tables
in A. W. Gomme, A Historical commenta~ on Thucydides (3 vols. to
dateJ Oxford, 19~5-t955', t, 39~J Merr t;-A. %. ~., tIl, 175 ff.

5r, 96.

The nature of the Athenian powep at this time was "a leadership
over allies who were autonomous and took part in the deliberations
of common assemb11es.,,6

Thus the Delian confederacy was at first a quite innocuous
union of tree Greek states whioh, under Athenian direction, sought
to reooup their losses in the Persian invasions by despoiling the
lands of the Great King.

But it is not this state of "pruaitlve

innooence" that we are chiefly interested in, but rather how this
free union became warped into the subsequent Athenian

E~~ire.

We

wish, at this stage in our narrative, to observe the tranmtion
between oonfederacy and empire and to see how the early

pu~ose

ot pursuing the Persians was subverted into the later purpose of
Athens eonquering her own allies.
LikeWise, starting with the formation of the confederacy in

478/7, we can begin to trace in the larger states at least the influence of their po1itioal upon their eoonomic life.

Once Athens

had gained control of the oonfederation of the allies and had
started to levy tribute from most of the cities of the Aegean
world, this military influence began to carry over into the eeon.

6I, 91, 1. The beginnings and the original purpose of the
Delian league may be found treated in the following secondary
sources: Bury, 328-3291 Eug~ne CavaigQ&c, Etudes sur l'H1stoire
Financ1dre d t Athenes au Cinqui~me S1eo1e rPar!s,~OD), pp. 184!86~ Percy ~araner. A nIstorz of AncIent Coinage (Oxford, 1918),
p. 286; J. A. O. Larsen, "The COnstItution and Original Purpose
ot the De11an League," narval~ Studies in Classioa1 PhilolofY,
LI (1940), 175-213J Wei!, 353-3>4.
--.
,
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ornic lite.

Athens, previously a strong merchant power, now be-

came vastly stronger.

And cities once able to compete with her

commercially were forced to submit to her economic tyranny as
w811·as her political domination.
This state of affairs, however, was not altogether
at first.

e~ident

The power ot Athens in the beginning was undefined and

seemed to be somewhat slight: and so neither her political nor
her economic mastery was felt at once.

But, as we shall see,

this power grew by constant exercise; and the gradual Athenian
ascendanoy in the oontrol of trade can be seen in the fact that
many cities were forced to switoh to her Attio-Euboio mint standard and many more were driven to give up the striking of coins
completely before the onslaught of the all-powerful Athenian
tetradrachm..

Naturally many of the small oi ties,

'II

hioh did not

ooin a.nyway, were not influenoed by this growth of power; but,
•
in the large:r cities, as the stranglehold of Athens grows
over the

Greek world, we oan watoh ooinage flicker and die out in many
formerly wealthy states.
It might be profitable at this point, before resuming our
narrative, to bring to the attention of the reader the relative
validity or cogency of our evidenoe.

Most of our material will

be takenfitom arohaeolo';ioal findings, disooveries of hoards and

ot isolated COins, that 1s, the complete find1ngs to date whioh
enable the num1smatlcian to attempt a true soienoe of ancient
coinage.

But, beoause of the nature of our topiC, the evidenoe
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which we shall draw from this field will be chiefly negat1ve--i.e.,
when the Athenians tightened their hold on
various issues of coinage disappeared.

th~

Aegean area, the

This negative evidence is

supplied by the fact that no coins have yet been disoovered to
fill in the contemporary gaps of the otherwise oomplete oOinage
series of these cities.
Such evidence in itself is tenuous.
moment we possess no coins

r~om

The fact that at this

a oertain period for a given city

does not mean that we will not find such coins in the future.
Hence any individual pieoe of negative evidence is liable to be
reversed at any time; and thus any individual statement made in
the course of this thesis with regard to the present state ot
numismatic evidenoe is always open to turther revision based on
new disooveries.

But, while the individual pieces ot evidenoe

may not be partioularly cogent, still the over-all picture possesses a cumulative validity that is almost overwhelming.

It

we

consider the present highly advanced state 7 ot Greek numismatics
and see how the coinage ot every Greek oity ot respectable size
is known in some detail for the period covering the last six centuries before the Christian era, we oannot help but notioe the
laounae observable in the case of fith-century ooinage--gaps so

7When we speak of the soienoe of numismatics being in an
advanoed state, we speak from the point ot view ot the classicist.
For our present purposes, we can glean muoh trom the present state
ot the soienoe. But, trom the point of view ot the numismatioian,
much remains to be done in clarifying the many details of his
broad field.

universal among the Ionian Greeks and others affiliated with
Athens that they cannot be insignifloant. 8 Coins from these
cities we have in abundance for- the sixth and fourth centuries.
The well-nigh complete absenoe of specimens from the fifth oould
hardly be an aocident; and, as we shall seein this and sucoeeding
ohapters, this was not an aooident, but evidence of the suo cess ot
a definite Athenian pollcy.9

8Lanoelot Lengyel, Chefs d'Oeuvre des Monnaies Orecgues
(Montrouge, 1952), p. 9.
--.
9General souroes on the soientifio value of aoins and/or negative evidenoe in the field are: Peroy Gardner, The !I2!! of Greek
Coins (CambrIdge, 1883), pp. 56-711 Stanley Lane=P'OoIe;-co!iis and .
Medals, Jrd revised egition (London, 1894), p. 12; Kurt £udwig--RegIlDS, Die Antike Mfinze ala Kunstwark (Berl'n, .924). p. 47;
Oskar Vle~antt, An£Iki diWIontsnormen und Munzfusse {Berlin, 1923
pp. 34-41.
- .
We should also note at thIs pOint that many of the ohief
souroes whioh we shall employ in establishing our numismatic history were published upwards of forty years ago. Headts Ristoria
Numorum, perhaps our most valuable single source, was p~E1isned
in 1911, the various catalogues ot the British Museum, written by
Head. Hill, Poole, and Wroth, were issued between 1877 and 1897;
Gardner's A Ristorf of Anoient cOlnif8 was published 1n 1918.
.
Relying heavi y-on such books
ght seem to date our treatment; but this is not entirely true", The other souroes that we
shall cite almost as frequently, such as Robinson (1949) and
Seltman, Greek Coins (1955), 1n many 1nstanoes treat much the same
matter as the older texts, though perhaps not extending their considera tions over as large an area. It is only tail' to remark that
these more recent studies, which are in general more specialized,
do not contradiot the older accounts (save in a very tew cases,
none of whiehatfect the Athenian Empire, e.g., as regards Athens
from 594 to 561), but merely till in more precise details in the
outlines of the older authors. The "dated" books still remain
authorities in their field and will oontinue to do so until some
one oombines their evidence with the more specialized recent
work into a new definitive volume. Such a project, however, is
not in Sight.
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Not all of our evidenoe, however, is negative.

There will

be a oertain amount which will oonsist in either the change

~rom

the looal to the Athenian standard of ourrenoy or the adoption
of

Athen1an~vices

on the ooins.

The

l~oal

standards were usually

fixed by theit- relative convenience as an exohange rate for a
g1ven 01 tYJ they would depend largely on t he standards of the
other states with whom the home oity was most likely to do business.

A shift in suoh a standard would indioate a corresponding

shift in the commercial life of the city brought about by some
exterior press of oiroumstanoes. IO

The seoond oommon type of

positive evidence, the adoption of Athenian emblems on a c1ty t s
coinage, would be a much more definite indioation of the plight
of a state.

The city states were proud of their native blazons;

and to surrender or to effaoe them in any way would hardly be oonsistent with the ordinary mode of aotion of a free city.11
But now let us return to our narrative.

After the Pelopon-

nesians had retired from Byzantium and the Athenians had gained
their rirst, slim hold on their allies, the Delian confederacy
or a nmuber of years pursued its martial aims. 12

Thuoydides is

sparing 1n his information on the early aotivities of the

oo~

l~hese oircumstanoes need not neoessarily be hostile in

character.

110n the relation between ooinage and state sov9reignty, Qon-)
G. F. Hill, A Handbook of Greek and Roman Coins {London, 1~99 ,
82-85.

-

,-

.-

after yielding to Athenian dominatio
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federacy.

He was not concerned with most of its actions against

the Persians in Asia tanor, since those would not oontribute to
his tale of the formation of the Athenian Empire.

Instead he

mentions only those campaigns which have a direct bearing on his
story--i.e., those which took place in the ehiefly Greek territories immediately surrounding the Aegean.

Hence he confines his

remarks on the operations of the Dolian league during the first
seven years of its existence to the following:
First, then, under the leadership of Cimon son
of Mlltiades, they took by siege Eion on the Strymon,
which the Persians held, and enslaved its inhabitants;
then they enslaved Soyros, the island in the Aegean
inhabited by Dolopians and colonized it themselves.
And a war arose between them and the Carystians, the
other Euboeans taking no part ~n it, and after a time
terms of capitulation were agreed upon. 1 3
These three seemingly insigniticant listings in themselves
tell us a good deal about the gradually shifting charaoter of the
confederaoy.

Eion on the Strymon river was a seaport in Thrace

about two hundred a.nd twenty-f'ive miles west ot the Hellespont.
In the year 476 it was the most important holding in the Thracian
region still in the hands ot the Persians.

Its strategic value

lay in the taot that it controlled the valley of the Strymon
leading northward into the hill oountry and that it was a convenient sea base near the rich gold mines on the northern mainland near Thasos.

Attacked in the late summer of 476,

Bog~s,

Persian oommander, held out under siege throufAout the winter,

13I. 9a, 1-3.

its
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but was eventually made to capitulate.

Thus Eion passed into the

hands of the confedoracy, who enslaved its inhabitants.

The

fallen condition of the oity is refleoted in the remark of the
British scholar Percy Gardner, who in hls Historl 2! Ancient
qoinage remarks: "It is noteworthy that we have no coin that we
can with confidence give to Elon on the Strymon in the middle of
the firth century. u14
The capture of Scyros, the second event mentioned by Thucydides in the early activities of the oonfeder-aoy, took place about

474.

Scyros, a rocky

ls1L~d

ln the Aegean between Attica and

western Thrace (and so on the sea route to the Hellespont), was
the stronghold of the Dolopian pirates, who preyed en passing
shipping.

The island fell to the forces of the confederacy, and

its inhabitants too were enslaved.

Besides this enslavement, the

island was annexed to Athens; and Athenian colonists were sent
to settle the land.
The capture of Scyros was the first recorded instanoe of
Athens receiving direct profit trom an adventure of the confederacy Which the other members of the group did not share.

Robinson

also notes that the previous coinage of the island ceases abrupt.
ly around It 70, a reasonable SUbstantiation of Thucydides t account,
all things oonsidered. 15
14aardner, Hlatoty. 274.

Cf. also Head, ~., 197.

lSE. Robinson, "The Athenian Currency Decree and the Coinages
of the Allies,n Hesperia, Supplement VIII (1949), 333.
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The third event was the war with the Carystians, which lasted
pl"obably from

475

or

414

till Lt 71.

Carystia, the southern part

of the island ot Euboea, was inhabited by a raoial group different
from the rest of the island; and thus its inhabitants were not
helped by their fellow Eubo6ens against Athens.

The Carystians

had orieinally refused to join the confederacy at Delos, but
now they were ooerced into doll1S so.

Athens felt that it \Vas dan-

gerous to have a neutral state so near to Attioa.

Carystus, the

city, was weak and unable to oarry on an extended war with the
Athenians.

It capitulated and thus became the first state forced

to join the oonfederacy against its will. l6
These three events nmrked a definite progress in the power
of Athena.

At first she worked with the confederacy tor its ad-

vantage, then tor her advantage; and finally she began to use the
confederacy almost as her personal tool, when sbe sought to swell
its ranks with people whose absence would be a distinct 'fiisadvantage for her.

The next ocourrenoe noted by Thuoydides brings

out this transition more sharply: membership in the confederacy
no longer remained a question of option, even for the original
r.lembers.

The once completely autonomous Greeks now found them...

selves as much under the thumb of Athens as the hapless Carystians.

...
16carystia in 471 entered the league as a subjeot, yet still
retained certain vestiges of freedom. It did not change its
coinage at this time, but only after further diffioulties and its
second capture. Secondat~y sources on Eion, Scyros, and Carystla
are: Bury, 336-338; Q. !::.. 11., V, 50-53; Cavaignao, Etude,S, h6.

Thuoydldes m!ll"ks this milestone in the following words:
Atter this they waged war upon the Naxians, who had revolted, and reduoed them by siege. And this was the
first allied oity to be enslaved in violation of the
established rule; but afterwards the others also were
enslaved as it happened in eaoh oa8e. 1 7
Some thirty years earlier, Naxos had been the wealthiest and most
powerful of the Cyolades.

But now, when it attempted to secede

from the league about 470,18 it was easily blookaded by the allied
fleet and reduoed to submission.

Thuoydldes gives no reasons

why Naxos should have wanted to secede, but it seems fairly obvious that there must have been some dissatisfaotion at this time
among the members of the confederacy with the burdens being

i~

posed by Athens.
Nor on the side of Athens was there wanting an e )touse.

Just

as "politioal necessity" had been alleged for taking over Carystus
so too, in the oase of Nazoa, Athens as administrator of the
confederacy was simply maintaining her right of foroing

~he in~

dividual mambaI's to fulfill -cheir obligations until the associa....
tion should be dissolved by the common oonsent of all.

The ac-

tion in itself may have seemed relatively simply done and perhaps
even oalled for by the oocasian, at least in the minds of the
Athenians.

But its real signifioance lay in the faot that by it

a preoedent was established and the terms of the original allianoe
definitely determined--the allies had not the right to seoede.

171, 98,

4.

l~e date may aotually have been anywhere from 470 to 467.
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"And this was

~le

first allied city to be enslaved in viola-

tion of' the established rule; but afterwards the others also wel"e
enslaved as it happened in each 08s•• ,,19

When Thuoydides speaks

of enslavement here, he uses the word. tOou).weTj.
N~~os

In other words.

was praotioally reduced to the status of a subjeot of' Athens1

a grirl punishment for seee ssion to warn any other states who
atten~t

might be inolined to

some similar oourse of aotion.

This

subservient state of the island is attested to by its oOinage,
whioh oeased

ab~uptly

around the year 410--a sign ot non-existent

autonol'l1y.20
Atter the desoription of the revolt of Naxos, Thuoydides
once

r.~re

interrupts the thread of his narrative by inserting a

brief paragl'"aph on the prinoipal oauses foI' revolts fttol1l the
league.

In general, he says th.at these were "failures in bring-

ing in the tribute Ott their quota of ships and, in some oases,
ttefusal of military servioe. tt21 Athens was exacting in her duties
as tribute collector; and .. YJhen states did not oomply with her

demands, she easily broU61'lt them into submission.
We noted above that Athana at the inception of the league
was

not particularly

19I, 98,

stl~ong.

How than was &"la able to put down

4.

20secondar--l SOUl"ces on the ooinage of Uaxos are: Gardner,
Historl. 244-243' Head, lIistoria Nwnorwu, 488; Robinson, 329.
Other seoonda:ry souroes on "Naxos wIt! be Given after our subsequent treatment of Thnsos in this chapter.

21I, 99. 1.
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~evolts

so readily?

The reason for her increased strength was

Many of the more short-s1gb.ted allies of the confederacy

~hil!l.

lad not been overly eager about sending their own citizens on the
Persian campaigns; so they h.ad preferred to pay to obtain substi ....
~utes

for t'H3Mices, both in men and in ships.

These substitutes

ffhioh they supported financially became praotically a part of the

l.thenian fleet; Athenians or Athonian r.10rcenaries manned the vessels, and Athonian commanders took complete charge ot' them.

Honee

i,he Athenian navy waxed strong. While the islanders sat

and

hO;:;le

paid to seal their own doom. 22
After the revolt of Uaxos, Thucydides mentions briefly the
battle at the river Eurymedon in pamphylia. 23

Here the conred-

era'eEl allies won deoisive victorles over the Persians both on
la.'1d and sea and seoured thereby control of southern Asia :1inor

f'rom Caria to Pamphylia..
co~nunities
~o

Hence they were enabled to force Lydian

to enroll in the league.

Alti~oud~

Thucydides refers

the battle in paSSing, it is easy to glimpse its far-reaching

effects among the cities of the region.

The most strilcing exam-ple

1s, of course, Ephesus, vHLlch exhibits a noteworthy series of
coinage beginning from approximately the year 700 B.C. and continuing through almost a millennium.

The only noticeable stop-

pae:e in the issues of this city occurred from the yeax's c. 469
221,

99, 1-3.

Confer o.lso Cavaignac, Etudes, 1}2.

23 1, 100, 1. The date of Eur~don ls,disputedJ it could
lUave t~{en place anywhere between 4b9 and 407
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to 415 and

m1?~t

be taken as an index of Athenst ascendancy in the

neighborhood--whlch began to wane arter the disaster in Sicily
around 415.24A few years artsr the battle at Eurymedon and the consequent
decline in the power ot the Great King over the Aor;ean coast, the
island of Thasos near Thrace revolted.

Tllucydides describes the

events of the years 465-463 with terrirylng brevity:
And some time af'te~ards it came to pass that the Thasians revolted .from them, a quarrel havinG arisen about
the trading posts and the rdne on the opposite coast of
Tlkrace, of which the Tha.sians enjoyed the profits.
Thereupon the Athenians sailed with their fleet again.st
Thasos, B....'1d, a.fter winning a battle at sea, disembarked
on the island. 2!;)
• • • and so the '.I'ha.lans, who were in the third year
of their siege, came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down their walls and dellve~ing over their ships,
agreein;:; to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should
be required of them and to render tribute in future, 26
and finally. givinG up both the mainla.nd and the mine. '

Thasos, the

strol1f~est

state in the whole northern region. around

Thra.cc, was much more powerful tha...'1 Naxos at the time of its

rebellion.

It had not been one of those states that had preferred

to pay for substitutes, but had continued to maintain its own

24souroes on the coina.ge of Ephesus and Lyoia, r.'l11c11 decros.
somewhat in the volume of its output dll.r1ng the next; few years,
are: Head, lIi~tor1a N'umorum, 573, 688.692; G. lP. Hill, c~taloFye
.2! 2 err-esk coIns 0"1 L:reia;, I!agPhl11a, .!!l£! Pis1dla (London, 1(17)
L"t-L"t1.

25 I ,

100, 2.

2<jI, 101. J.
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large fleet up until this time.

Consequently, it was better able

to resist the siege of Athens and mi[;ht even have had sone Sllcoess

in its defianoe of the imperial oi ty, but the unforttrrlate ooourof the earthqual:a at Sparta and the subsequent revolt of

l~ence

the Helots prevented them from l"eooi vine; tho

that quarter.

Thus in the winter of

pron~tsod

aid fron.

46)/2 they capitulated,

surrenderinG their fleet, pLulin0 down their fortifications, and
~iving

up their posts on tho mainland as well as their

work the rich gold mines of Mount

ri~~ts

to

Pa~~aeus.

These mines had previously provided the ohief source of X'e.
venue for the Thasians, and their loss profoundly affected the
city.

Though Athans did not impose a ban on their COinage, still

their once opulent flow of satyr and dolphin money pieces slowed
down to a trickle after
m~intGd

463. Also, vmereas they had formerly

on the Babylonian standard, now they gradually chang$d

their issues to the Attic standard; tho weight of

theirarac~~s

steadily deoreased until they reaohed the level of Athenian coins
and, in some instanoes, even dropped below it. 27
Even more interesting to observe was what the Athenians did
with their newly acquired Gold.

Athenian

cur~ency

had ubJays been

issued on a strict silver standard; and it would have Greatly com...

34
'Dlicated. her trad.e relations to have be;?;un issu1ns on a gold one
as well.
i'l'tOl'll

where

Consequently, tho Athenians shipped the bars of sold

tlount Pangaeus to CYZ1Clls, a poor c1 ty in tho Hellespont,
eleotZ"Ul~

pieoes

1.fOre

then minted.

These ooins wore then em-

ployed in trade with the people o:f Asia 1i11nor who still used the
Persia.."1 or Babylonian standard, one whioh was based pI'imnr1ly on
cold.

Without interfel'ting with her own domestic COE1nlCrCe, this

pl"actice afforded Athens an outlet for her gold and offered her
further eoonor.1io communication With the East.
The fact that these eleotrum coins of GyziotlS,which began
towards the middle of the :fifth

centu.ry~

really belol'll;;ed to

.<l.thenial1. interests is evidenced both by the previous indicence

of the city and by the devioes placed on the pieoes.
Attic

dasi(~s

Such typical

as Har:aodius and Ar1stogai ton, Ge holdin:? young

Er1chthonius" Cecrops, 8...'I1.d Triptolemus in his winged

OaJ:~

appear

among the great variety of types in the new electrUt71 coinage.

The

staters continued to appear down until the time of Alexander. 2D

With. the conquering of bot:1 Nuos and 'Ihasos, the ohains of
empire wore &,Tadually bein,'; forGed.

By tIle year 1~60. t~lrOC classes

oi.' members in the oonfederacy had become apparent: (1) tho non-

2DThe abundant e1eotrum coinage of Cyzicus rr~y be found
treats'.! in: Gavaignac, Etudes, 184... 186; Von \Val ther Giesecke,
A~~ikes ge,ldwesen (Leipzig, 1:938),68-751 Gardner, Hist~~, 23123J; G. F. UIli, A Guide to the De12artment of Goins anu. f.Iedals
.~ the i3:':'itisfl 1fU3e~, "lrueU=-(!;ondon, !92m. 'PP. lr-It3; d. 1'.
$01 E;1iL~, r.lastetplaces .2! G::;;-eek CoinaGe, (Oxford, 191./-9), p. 211
John Ward, Greek CoIns
Their Pa.ren,~ Oities (London. 1902),
PP. 97-99.

!!.!2
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tributary allies who furnished ships, c .. g.,. Ghlos, Lashos, Samos;
(2) tributary allies wh.o remained independent,

0.[,;.,

Abdera,

Aenos, S1nopeJ (3) tributary allies who were dependent, e. C;. J
}Taxos, Thasos, Carystus.

All cities coerced to join and all

cities that had revolted and were subsequently subdued belonz,ed
to this third class, in which Athens wished eventually to include
everyone.
About this time, also, nrobably in !~6l, perioles, the man

chiefly responsible .for the final state of the Athenian Empire,
ca.me to power.
co~~ection

ThouGh h1s name is not mentioned explicitly in

with the actions ot the next decade or so,. still it

is reasonably certain that he was the guiding light behind most
of' the

~"1onders

wrOUGht by Athens, which by the middle of the cen-

tUl"'y had secured her supremacy over the Aegean world.
After the revolt of Thasos, the next event mentioned by
Thucydides in connection with
the war with Asgin&..

th~

rise of the Athenian

t~1re

is

Aegina, a sma.ll island just south of Athens,

had been one of the foremost merchant powers in Greece for the
two centuries prlor to tho Parsia..."'l wars.

She had been

t?1El

first

state in Europe to issue coinage; and her tortoise-back coins
VJare

known allover the civilized world.

Her Aeginetan. standard

had l:)ecome so firmly established in the Peloponnese, as well u.s

in other reGions, that even Athens was forced to pay all Peloponnesia.n mercenaries in this distasteful foreign standard.

Ae:;:;ina

had feared the sudden rise of the Athenian power in the Aegean

because her trade l"C)utes wIth. the East and tho r:roater part of
her COl:tmerCe lay in tha'::; area.

The 8i tuation becarl10 desperate

when Athens completed negotiations with Megara for the
use of the port lliso.ea.

was the first to realize that this

Ji.e:~;ina

would [:,iva the Athenians almost complete control over the Saronic
Cult.

Other Peloponnesian states also fea.red the Athenian menaoe
which

\7808 movinr~

in in their near vioinity.

They joined with

!.Ikeglna into a large ooalition f'leet, whlch Athens defeated near

Aeglna in tho sU!Zl.t'1ler of'

458.

Athana then followed up her advan-

tar;;a b:r investing the lh"lf'ortunate island both. by land and sea.
f\fter a siege of two years, Aec:lna fell, agreed to surrender her
fleet, a.nd to pay tribute to Athens.

This was a welcome suecess

for the Athenial'ls both strategically and e011llnercially.
wi til Thusoa, Aegina was

a.mont~

the

1:10St

Along

opulent of the subject

3tates; they were both assessed th.irty talents per year,· much
;"!10re than the other cities.
The decline of AeZlna after

±rop in her output of coinage.

456

is likewise reEleoted in the

As befitted a. prosnerous mercl1ant

city, she had, prior to Ii-56, issued drachms and tetradrachms on
a 2;rand ocale and. had. even been oxperlmentinr 1".tL th a new reverse

typo to replace her wcll-lolown 1ncuse just before

~er

demise.

But now, she ceased to mint the larger denominat;1ons, though she

::!ontinuoc1 to

~llll-;;

a small supply of triobols j"'or local use.

81nce her standaI>d a.f'ter such a great vogue of mora tha.."l two cen....

37
turie. could hardly be ehan.l~ed, she was a.llowed to preserve It.29
i~bI1.

the s lege ot" Aefl,lna was still In propress in

457, the

Spartans had sent an army north into Boeotian terrItory, ostensibly to help their fellow Dorian oities who v/ere being oppressed
by Phocla.

The real purpose, however, had been to join forcos

wi th the Boootlana and than to make a combined attaC!k on the Athe-

nia.ns..

This coalition foroe won a viotory over a larf:c Athenian

a.rmy at Tanagrl.1, r..ot far fl"om tho boroer of Boeotia and Attica.
f·~ut

the battle was not deoisive, and the Spartans withdraw soon

afterwards to their hOMola.nd.
About two months after

departure of the Spartan troops,

tr~

the Athenia.ns avenged themselves.

Marohing onco aGain into

Boeotian terri tory, they eas lly overcame the looal foroes at
Oenophyta, thus gaining control over the whole land except for
Thebes.

The newly aoquired oities were not foroed to joIn the

confederacy, but only to furnIsh soldiers men demanded:

(The

reason for this 1 $Ilieney is that A ~'1.enB t hold over them was probably slim} and she wished, If
immediate revolt.)

POBS

ibIe, to avoid

en~enderlng

an

The Athenians, howew.)r, did ut:tlizo t,:"ls op-

portunity to set up demooratic rove~nment8 in many 01ties.30
29souroOB for the coinago of Aogina are: C. S. Comparottl
CoIns nl~nf Yorit, 1921), pp.
JUstorla, 395-3C}7; Pobins,:m, 336.
30 lt was the our1"ent holter in polltios that democratIc i~OVernments even among tradl tlon.:'llly hos tile peopll3s would be fa vorable to a democratic Rovernment at home. !lhe fallacy or thia
statement was proved over and over again to the li.theni:ms duril1"t'r.
the course of the next fOl.. ty J'ours.

A Dasorl11t1v! Catalop;ue of Greek
55; Gardner, History, 241: !lead,

-

54-

'1'hi s temporary eclipse of Boeotian power is 80me\"OO t re-

flected in their coinage.

Oligarchic governments at Tanagra and

Orchomenus had been minting actively since about 1j.7R; but their
issues cease in
democratic

457.

And, under the Athenian aegis, four small

governroent8--Acraeph~um,

Coroneia, Haliartus, and

Tanagra--celebrated their autonomy by issuing coin.

These new

issues continued just for the short period of Attic supremacy in
the area.3 l
The rising star of Athenian imperialism, as far as we know,
was marred by only one setback during this era.
ill-fated Athenian expedition to Egypt.

In

This was the

460, about two hundred

ships of the league had gone to the land of the Nile to aid the
Libyan Inarus, who was attempting to revolt from the pro-Persian
administration.

This large force had fought with varying suc-

cess for about six years; but :fInally the enemy had trapped the
Athenian forces and well nigh annihilated them in

454.

'Thucy-

dides devotes a long section of his wrk to the telling of this
grandiose enterprise; but it has only indirect bearing on the
rise of the Athenian Empire, as we shall presently see.
In the year

454,

after the news of the disaster in Egypt had

31The coins of Boeotia are treated in detail in Head's Coin.
2! Boeotia (Oxford, 1881). The effects of the current battles are
mentioned on pages 196 through 200.
Thucydides treats the campaigns of Aegina and Boeotia in
Secondary sources on this historl are: Bury, 3553/7; ~. !. R., V. 76.83; Cavaignac, Etudes, 56.
!~

105-108.
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reached Athens, Pericles made the bold stroke which left no doubt
as to the status of the Pelian confederacy.

He removed the trea-

sury from its former headquarters on the island of Delos and installed it on the Acropolis in Athens.
end.

All pretense was at an

The league had now openly become the Empire of the Athenians
It is strange that Thucydides makes no mention of this im-

portant move.

We know of it only throu,gh

]a

ter historians. es-

pecially Plutarch,3 2 and from the quota lists which now begin to
appear regularly.

These lists, ¥bieh were kept as treasury re-

cords to show the payment of the annual d,1ta.px1}, begin in the year

454/3 •.33
Commentators on Thucydides have regarded this omission as
somewhat of a mystery beoause, as is generally agreed, the transfer of the treasury was perhaps the most important single event
in the transi tiOll from confederacy to empire.

tfuis was the de-

cisive ooint in the relationship between Athens and her'allies,
and Athens could from now on do pretty much as she liked with the
~roup.

Various reasons for the omission have been offered.

Thilcydides pays lIttle attention to the levying of tribute and
other economic aspeots of war, though he does not ignore them
completely.

But this i8 not wholly satisfaotory, beoause he will

on oocasion stop to relate almost insignifioant finanoial details,
32P~rioles, XII, 1.

33The cilt:a.pXT) was one-sixtieth of the rep,ular annual assessment, paid to Athena for use of her precinct as treasury.

40
~8 we shall see later. J 4 Others suggest that the event was too
~ell

known, and that Thucydides did not wish merely to repeat

earlier ehroniolers and rehash the obvious.
~e

But there seems to

little foundation tor this eontention, sinoe the historian

~oes

not hesitate to relate such well-worn themes as the woes ot

the Sioilian Expedition, the siege ot Plataea, and so forth.
~enee

some maintain that Thucydides left the transfer ot the

treasury out at his acoount because it would not fit into the
scheme ot his attempted justifieation or the Empire.

Yet this

too does not seem likely, sinoe the rising power of Persian
Egypt and the conseq,uent pl"estige offered the Phoenieian fleet
in the Aegean would have affopded the Athenians ample alibi for
the removal.

And Thuoydides has not hesitated to tell us of

events, e.g., the Malian aftair, where the Athenian exouse was
~uoh

less plausible.

We will

retu~

to this problem again in a

~uture chapter. 35
By way of summary. then, of thls period trom
IUs make the followlng obseI'Vatlons.

418

to

454,

let

After our initlal remarks

on the origin ot the Delianleague, whioh oould hardly be SUbstantiated t tt'om numismatics, we were able for the most part to trace
~

certain parallelism between Thucydldes' narratlve and the evi-

34conter Appendix I.

35Th• subjeot ot the removal ot the treasury 1s discussed
in: Bury, 339-340, Q. !_ g_, V, 84-85. Cavai~~ao, Etudes, 59-62.

Gamme, I, 370-372.

dence from coinage.

With the exceptions of Eion, which had not

issued cOinage previous to her aapture, and Carystus, whiah remained somewhat independent under the aonfederacy until

446,

the

other major exploits of Athens lett their mark on contemporary
coinas~.

Sayros, Naxos, Ephesus, Tanagra, Orchomenus, all stopped

minting when they tell under Athenian domination.

The onoe weal-

thy states of Thasos and Aegina were foroed to curtail their output of aoins drastically, and Thasos even switched from the Babylonian to the Attic standard.

At the same time, Cysious profited

by the new Athenian management of the Thasian gold mines and be-

gan to issue her prolific staters with the pro-Athenian blazons.
And even tiny Delos, under Athenian administration, issued no
ooins after the inoeption of the league in

478/7.

Finally, the

great stone tablets from the Aoropolis and passages 1n later
historians tell us of the removal of the treasury from its original site at Delos, tilling in

Ii

lacuna 1n Thuoyd1des t narrative.

Thus we tind consIderable help In substantiating the Thuoyd1dean
aocount ot the years

478-454

through ooinage and even, 1n the par-

t10ular 1nstanoes ot Ephesus and the transter ot the treasury,
adding to it.
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--Aristophanes, Aves, 1037-1041.
In

451,

the Peloponnesians and the Athenians agreed to ob-

serve a five-year truce.

This left Athens free to settle the

Persian question once and for all.

Amassing the collective

strength of her empire, she conducted a number of
Egypt and Cyprus.

Eventually, in

449,

campai~ns

in

her forces won memorable

victories both on land and sea near Salamis in Cyprus.

The Per-

sians sued for a permanent peace, which the Athenians joyfully
concluded, pro~ably in the same year. l
Once peace with the Persians had become a reality, there
was no lonr;er the slightest pretext for allowing the old Delian
confederacy to continue; its original express purpose had been
accomplished.

Athena, however, instead of relinquishing her

hold on the members of the old league, tightened her grip on the
foreign states by issuing in the year

449

what was known as the

lSources on the treaties of 451 and 449 are: Thuoydldes, I,
112, 1-4; Bury, 359-360; ~. !. li., v, 87.
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Decree of Clearchus. 2
This new decree protected the I-\. thenian monopoly 01' trade by
forbidding: (1) the strikinf~ of silvaI' coins in any of the cities

of" what was now her empire; (2) the use of any currencYJI we5_ghts,
and measures other than Athenian.

Aegina, there was still a mass of

Deapi te the recent d afaa t of
Aeglnet~l

money in circulation,

which provided a constant and irritating reminder to Athens of
that city's all-too-recent greatness; and this was probably a
major factor in the promulgation of the law. 3

By the very .fact

that such a stern proclamation could be enforced and that states
could be forbidden, as Seltman puts it, to

"fly their national

flag by stamping their state device upon coinage,,,4 proves that
Athens at this time possessed true imperial power and that auto-

2We do net possess a complete text of the Decroe of Cloarchw
A partial resoration may be found in Robinson, 327.
The contents and date of the decree may be lnferred< hoth
f~om the incomplete text and from a later decree, published to
rel:lforce the requirements of the former. ffuis second decree.
probably published 8ornath:"e between 423 and 420, likewise spoke
of the desired uniformity among, the states of the Empire in the
matter of money, weiGhts, and measures. A complete text; of this
latter decree may be found in: Karl Friedrich WiL~e1m Dittenberger
.§L~!:.9~f! InscriE,tionum Grn.oc~.~um (4 vols.; Leipz5.g, 191.5-1924>, I,
111-124; Marcus N. Tod" A Selection of Greek Historical InscripJt!9..M (Oxford, 1933), 7f61',-pp. 163-105'.
JRob ins on, 325.

4This quotation 1s an adaptation of a statement of Selcman
in his Greek Coin" 2nd ad. (London, 1955), p. 112.
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nomy for many states had ceased to exist.
Thus we might say that the effects of this decree serve to
show the extent of Athens' power at this time.

Among the states

of the Aegean world which ceased issuing coinage around the year

450 for no apparent reason other than this decree, we find the
following:
Abydus
Aenos
Antandros
Asaos
Camlrus
Carthaea
Cebren
Chalcedon
Chersonesus (Hellespont)
Clazomenae

Cnldus
Colophon
Cyme
Dardanus
Dlkaea (Eretrla)
Halicarnassus
Ialysus
Lampsacus
Lindus
Mende

Paros
Phasells
Potldaea
Scapsa
Scepsis
Sclone
Selymbria
Slphnos
Stag ira
Terone. 5

It is certainly more than c oine idence that all these e:1. ties should
stop minting within about a year of one another; and it provides
ample substantiation of the success of the Decree of Clearehus.
These,however, are just the states which Intermitted their
coinage for the first time aeter the decree.

tl'l.'1ere were a number

of other states wrrich had also previously issued coins, but seem
to have stopped even before
Aeglna
Andros
Astypalaea

449:
Calymna
Carpathus
Caryatus

Chaleis
Chersonesus
(Carla)

,----_._----5The data contained in this list may all be verified by the
tables in Robinson. Some of It can likewise be gotten from Head,
Hratoria Numorum, and Gardner, History. For a detailed substantiation with regard to the coinage of Aenos, confer J. M. F. May,
~f.noa, Its lUstorz !.!!S.£2.~~ (Oxford, 1950); this work contains many fine tables for that state and its colna~e durin,r: the
whole of the fifth century.
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Cor,sia
Coso
Delos
Dikaea (Abdera)
Ephesus
Eretria
Erythrae
Iasus

Iuli.
Methymna
Naxos
Olynthus (Chalcidice)
Parium

Peparethos
Smothrace
Scithae
Scyros

Seriphus
Sermylia
Tenedos
Tenos
Termera
Thasos
Thera
1 inde.'7
I

'!'hese two lists, taken together, give us a fine indication of theeffectiveness of Athenian domination. 8
Once again. we rous t remark the stra.nge. ilence of Thucydides
on this matter.

He makes no mention whatsoever of what was per-

haps the first official act of tyrwlny on the part of the Athenians; and such an explicit show of imperial power could hardly
have escaped his notice.

Why did he leave out tho decree?

are at least two possible reasons that we might adduce.

There

Of the

thirty-three names given in the second list, we might infer only
seven from the previous Thucydidean text--Aegina, Carystus, Delos,
Ephesus, Naxos, Scyros, and Thasos.

when and how the downfall of

the other twenty-six states came about Is left to our imagination;

6From 449 on, Cos was permitted to issue only a few commemorative coins (no national currency) in honor of her festival of
Apollo. (Head, Historia Humorum, 632.)
7Th1s list may also be substantiated in 1"I;s entirety from

the tables in Robinson and the other sources mentioned in note 5
on the precedinG page. I have omitted Tanagra and Orchomenus
from this lift because they resumed coinage (i.e., oligarchical
coinage through Thebes) shortly after the deoree 'L1ent into effect.

8S ome cities8uch as Cnldus, even thoue;h their regular

series had ceased in 449. were allowed to mint small denominations'
on the Attic standard. Confer the tables in Robinson.
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Thucydides probably did not deem their dGmise worthy of note.
And, in a similar mariller, he may not have thought that the suppress ion of many 01' the cities in the :eirs t list was worth mentioning and hence omitted all reference to the decree, as he had
omitted the trans'fer of the treasury some five years earlier--a
A second possible reason why Thucy-

much more important event.

dides neglected the decree may be that its conditions were not
universally en'forceable.

Regions at some dis tance from Athens

and thus not so rigidly under her domination either continued
to mint as before, e.g., tycia,9 or eventually had to be given
concessions so as to stave off revolt, e.g., the Thracian region
after 439. 10
Athens was now a t the height of her power in the fifth century.

She had control over most of the cities in the AeGean area,

with large holdings in Euboea, Thrace, the Euxine, the Hellespont,
Ionia, Caria, Lycia, and the Cyclades, with a few outposts in the
Peloponnese (e.g., Troezen) and in Western Greece (e.g., NaupactUB) •

She was al so in allianee wi th Megara and was operating the. t

city's port at Hisaea.

She ruled Aegina and had nothing to fear

from her conquered northern

nei&~bors

in Boeotia.

Furthermore,

because of her five-year truce with Sparta and her allies, she

4:)0.

9The silver coinage of Lycia was evidently back to normal by

lOWe will return to th:ts subject later on in the chapter.
Secondary sources on the Decree of Clearchus include: Bury,
366; Seltman. Greek Coins, III and 155, note; Weil, 356.
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was for the moment free to consolidate her holdings.

In this

undertaking, however, she would not be altogether succesaful.
In

448

a small ser'ies of hos till ties took place, which have

usually been dignified by historians by the term, the "Sacred
War. tI

The Spartans marched north across the Isthmus of Corinth

to expel the Phocians from Delphi and to make the international
oracle autonomous.

When they departed,

in possession of the shrine.

thej<~

left the Delphians

The Athenians meanwhile, careful

not to violate the truce, waited until the Spartans had left and
then went and reinstated the Phocians.
that is, f'rom

448

Beg1Iming in this period,

to 421, the previous series of

coina~e

from

Delphi, featuring the head of the eponymous Delphos, is .interrupted--lendlng credibility to 'I'hucydides' account of Athenian ascendancy over both Phoclans and Delphians. ll
The following year,

447, the Thebans incited a rebellion

in the extreme northwest of Boeotia.

The Athenians at first

did not thInk that the uprising would prove to be serious and
sent out
ance.

a

token force of one thousand men to quell the disturb.

TheIr army was ba.dly beaten at Coronea, and n:tany of the

Athenlans were taken prisoner.

Holding these men as hostages,

the Boeotians then forced the Athenians to evacuate their whole
territory to regain

~leir

captured troops.

After these severe

losses, Loerls and ot'ler 01 ties renounced their alliance with
Athens; nnd, with a single unfortunate incident, the entlre emIlThuc:vdidesa IJL 112. 5.

Head. Hiatoria Numor'WIL. 1L'_O-1hl
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pire of Athens to its immediate north collapsed. 12
Once the authority of the Athenians over Boeotia had ceased,
so did the many independent governments which had been issuing

457. Thebes regained her suzerainty over the land;
446, hers are the only Boeotian coins seen for some

coinage since

and, ufter
time. 13

The next year,

446,

the year in which the treaty with the

Peloponnes ians was due to expire, the At!lenians suffered more
reverses of fortune.

Thuoydides tells of the events of. this

year quite succinctly:
Not long after this Euboea revolted from Athens;
and Pericles had just crossed over to the island with
an Athenian army when word was brought to him the. t
Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were
about to invade Attica, and that all the Athenian
garrison had been destroyed by the Megarians except
such as had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had
effected this revolt by bringing Corinthians, Sicyonians,
and Epidaurians to their aid. So Pericles in haste
brought his army back again from BUboea. After thi~
the Peloponnesians, under the comma.nd of Pleistoanax,
son of Pausanlas, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced
into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, r~vaglng
the country; but without going further, th,y returned
home. Thereupon the Athenians again crossed over into Euboea undE'~' the command of Pericles and subdued
the whole of it; the rest of the island they settled
by agreement, but expelled the Hestiaeans from their
homes and themselves occupied the territory.
WIthdrawing their troops from Euboea not long
af'terwards they made a truce with the Lacedaemonlans
and their allies which was to last for thirty years,

12Thucydides, I, 113.
13Head, Coins ~ Boeotia, 201.209.
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restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Aehaea; for these
were the places be1op.!,:,ing to the Pe1oponneslc:..ns whic:l
the Athenians he1d. 1 4
The enemies of Athens had timed their actions well in

446.

Euboean revel t drew Peri cles and his men away from Athens.
when PeJ:"lcles was informed of the massacre of the

,.1.

The
'!'hen,

thenian gar-

rison at Megara and of the Peloponnesians menacing Attica. he
was forced to return to defend his home territory.

l'he Spartans

and their allIes were content with a few spoils from the Athenian
homeland, as long as they succeeded in freeing the Megarld from
imperial control; so they soon retired.

Then Pericles was free

to concentrate his attention on Euboea, which he quickly conquered and made the Whole island subject to him--just as Carystia
on the southern tip had been reduced some twenty-five years
earlier.

The Hestiaeans were so harshly dealt with probably be-

cause their resistance was the most obstinate.

They were driven

from their homes, and their land was annexed to Athens.
This downfall of Euboea to the status of subject state was
reflected also in her namismatlc life.

The right of coinage was

withdrawn from all cities on the island in L~46, a.nd no more of
their cuttlefish or nymph coins were seen until
The events of this fateful year had
lesson.

taur~t

411.15
the Athenians a

They could not successt'ul.1y manage wars on two fronts

14I, 114-115, 1.
15I , 114 •

Hsad, HIst~p~a Numorum,

355 -357.
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at one time; and they could not keep their empire in check and
the Peloponnesians out or their territory.

They had lost their

' 16
va 1UB. hle con tr 0 1 over th0 ,.""
e,7a.r id.l:In th
.. e process.
same

Lest this

error be cont."ni tted ar;ain, the Athenians decided to take

time off to consolidate the:ir holding; and, to this encl, t,hey
concluded a rather expenslve treaty with the Peloponnesians,
which was to last for thirty years.

In the agreement, they were

obliged to surrender Pegae and Nisaea, the two ports they had

been using on the Megarid, Troezen, the only city in the Pelopon.
Ilsse which used the Attic standard on their coinage and which
put Athenian emblems on their money such as the helmeted Athena,l7
and Achaea--in short, all the ir holdings in the Peloponnese. 18
Thus. within the space of two brief years, Athens had lost
slmost all her empire in her immediate vicinity on the Greek

mainland: both Boeotia and Megara.
:Ae~dna

Though she still retaIned

and, of course, Attica, she now began to take steps thqt

this would not occur again and that all the places which she then
held would never be able to stage such successful revol ts.

16Since none of the coins of 1>1iegara were inscribed unt!l the
first half of the fourth century, it is dif'ficul t to asce:r'tain
whether or not the ten-year domination of Athens had any effect
on her coinage. (Head, Historia Numorum, 393.)

17The coins of Troezen are treated in Head,

!.2.1:£., 4L~3.

18 I • 114. Secondary sources on the history of the campai,gns
~n Boeotia, Euboea. and Meg~r& are: Bury, 361-363; ~. !. ll., V,
~8-90J Cavaignac, Etudes, 56. Secondary sources on the peace of
446 a~.: Bury, 362-363;
~. H., V, 90-92. Cf. also I, 115, 1.

£.
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Probably Athens exper:i.enced no more serious difficulties for
the next six yea.rs

a.t~d

was able to weld her Empire into a. reason-

ably well-organized whole.

F'or noi the I' nurn.ismat1.cA

:n~r

'l'hucy-

didos tell us of any untoward event after the peace treaty of

446

until the Samian War, wI11ch beGun :in

h4o.

The occasion of this war was a dispute wh:tch arose between
Samos a.nd Mile tus about the possession of Priene, a town between

them on the mainla.nd of' Ionia.

In the wax' which resulted from

their quarrel, Miletus was vanquished and, as a tributary ally.
appealed to Athens against Samos, an independent ally.

These

cries of the Mll.esians were seconded by a group of private citI ...
zens of' Samoa who disliked their current government and desired
to set up a new ona.

Athens decided the case In favor> of Milotus.

?er:tcleg

sailed ,lith forty triremes to S9.m03 and overthrew the rctr;ning
•
aristocracy. He took :-lOstar:es fr·:J':?'\ among the overthro~m narty
and establls:10d a. dOrlJcraey, leaving behind him an At l 18ntan
rison for their protection.

The exiled nobles,

1-1

owe ver ,

fled to the :mainland, dId not take their defeat lir:htly.

~'!ho

~ar-

had

En11_st-

Ing the aupport of' the sa trap of Sardis" the:r hired so::ne mercenar-ies and orossed over to Samoa by night.

They to,;>}: the Athe-

nians by 8uprise, imprisoned them along with the dair.oarats who
fell into their hands, and also secretly removed their hostages

from Lemnos where they were being detained.

ferioles, however, was not entirely inactive.

He and a
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fleet of fifty-three sh:tps fought the Samian fleat off' the island
of Traryia. and prevailed.

He then

blockaded Sa:.-nos by sea and in-

vested the city itself with three wa.lls, r,uarded by Athenian
Ineantry.

The Samians resisted for about eight months, but

finally agreed to capltulate--pttlling down their walls, ,?;iving
over hostages, surrendering their ships, and paying an indemnity!
The democratic government was reinstated. 20
Samos seems to have been the first city that attcr::rl;Jted re-

volt that was allowed after recapture to retain a measure of her
old freedom.

nlis was in all probability due to one or all of

the following considerations: her nearness of blood to the Athantan pe opla, her large size, her previous record of loyalty, or

the oocas ion for the revol t (since she had not premed1. tat;ed the

defection, but merely had refused to accept an Athenian decision).
Her rip.;hts wore someV'lhat curtailed; after the surrender, she was
•
made to abandon her former }::ilesian standard of coinage for' the

Attie.

Her new coins, much superior in. stylo to her prav':tous ones

are so strikingly dIfferent from them that it is presumed that

the dies were engraved by Athenian artists imported during a
period of heavy Athenian influence.

Later on, when an aristo-

19Dur.tng the Samian trouble of 440-439, Byzantium had also
revolted. But, after the fall of Samos, she quickly came to terms
with Athens, agreeing to be subject as before. This revolt of
b.lzaIltl um is no ted by Thuc~7dl des in I, 115, .5 and 117, 3.
20 The revolt of Samos is treated in I, 115, 2 - 117; Bury,
R
01
3".3-3;';1+1
£. !. !l., v, 169-171.
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cratic party friendly to the Athenians came to power about 428,
the Athenians allowed them once more to mint on the ;ifileslan
standard; but an olive branch, similar to that found on Athenian
coinage, regularly takes its place in the field, testifying to
Samian loyalty to Athens. 2l
After this revolt, some concessions on the subject of coinage
seem to have been made, especially to the northern allies in the
Thracian tribute region.

Aphytis, Mende, Aenos, and Thasos

resumed their interrupted coinage sometime shortly after

440.

Perhaps this softening of imperial policy might hint at an effort
being made to keep some of the allies who disliked Athenian financial policy and whose remoteness mtrAt afford Borne difficulty in
supressing potential revolts.

Such a sortening in policy 1s not

revealed by Thucydidesj but this is hardly to be expected since
he does not mention the inauguration of the policy in

hh9.G:"

~?

•

Arter this slight change in Thrace, Thucy-dides, in canclud-

2lThe coins of Samos are treated in Comparetti, 78; Gardner,
Hi!tory, 248-250; Head, Historia Numorum, 602-603; Robinson, 330331. An interesting sidelight to the .. itch in minting standards
at this time Is the corresponding change in other weights and
measures. During the las t century, one of the ancien.t mea.surement standards from this period was round on Samos, with the
Attic standards inscribed over the earlier Samian standards--a
striking confirmation of both Thucydldes and coinage. F'or this
find, confer A. MIchaelis, "The Metrological Relief at Oxrord,1I
Th~ Jo~nal ~ Hellenic ~tudles, IV (1883), 335-350, but espeoially par:e340.
22The Thracian concessions may be found treated in Q.• !. H.,
V, 171-176 and Robinson, 338.

I
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1ng h1s account of the remaining seven years of the Pentecontetia,

439-432,

tou~~es

briefly on the two events that immediately pre-

ceded the Peloponneslan War: the Corcyrean affair and the battles
at Potidaea, which later came to be interpreted as an Athenian
violation of the truce of 446. 23

Corcyra had a.ays remained

an independent ally of Athens; hence no change is observed in
hal' coinage.

Potldaea was Included a.monr: those allies of the

Athenia.ns who ceased minting in 449 after the Decree of Clearchus;
and she did not, of course, mint during her brief period of
revolt. 24
After these events, Sparta summoned an assembly of her allies
who had grievanoes against Athens with regard to the violation of
the th!rty-years peace.

During the meetings of this assembly,

various speeches were given, including the defense s peoch of the
Athenian already mentioned in chapter one and a speech by the
aged Spartan king Archldamus, who counselled postponing •hostilities against

80

strong a power as Athens.

Eventually this first

aS8embly of the Lacedaemonians and their allies decided that the
treaty had been broken25 and that the Athenians were in the wrong.
2JTh.e brief mention of Potidaea and Corcyra is made :tn I,
IlS, 1 at the end of 11'hucydidas' account of the Pentecontetia.
He had treated them at length in I, 56-67 and I, 24-55 earlier.
24For the coins of Corcyra., confer, Historia NmnortL.'!!, 325-

326; for those of Pot1daea, confer Robinson 333
25I, 87-88.

ft.
'I
II
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The meeting adjourned, and the Spartans sent envoys to
Delphi to

asce~tain

the advisabIlity of going to war.

After re-

oeiving a favorable reply from the god,26 they convened another
assembly of their allies to find out whether all their Peloponneslan contederates wanted to go to war with tnem. 27 Atter sundry speeohes, the majority voted tor war;

and

preparations tor

their first oftensive to be undertaken in the following year were
begun. 28

By way of summary, then, for the early
from

454

1e~s

ot the Empire

to 432, let us make the following observations.

events disoussed 1n this chapter, namely the truce of
the Spartans, the treaty ot

449

Three

451 with

with the Persians, and the as-

semblies at Sparta in 432, oan ot their very nature reoelve no
substantIation trom numismatios.29

The treaty ot

446

With the

Peloponnesians receive. at best an indirect confirmation ot one ot
its oonditlons--namely that Troezen was a town associatea with
Athens, as seen from its related standard and emblem., faots unparalleled elsewhere in the Peloponnese.

We do not, however,

know enough about Troezen's tifth-century coins to be able to say
that they ceased to be struck in this manner atter the oity came

26 1,

118,

3.

271, 125,

1.

2~he as&embl..les at sp.arta are descr1bed 1n It 67-89 and 118394-390' £. !. !i., v, 187-189.
29Pe. commemoratIve coins were issued by the anoient Greeks.
Though not absolutely impossIble, it 1s hIghly improbable that
they would be issued here.

125J Bury,

under the dcmir..a tior;. of the l'eloponnos J:~ns.
co:tna~e

of Mer;;a.ra.

lo'rom thE, fact that

t\1C

Simi.l8, i:"ly ¥Ii th the

money oftb.at c Ity was

not Inscrlbcd at this periJd, we can tell very liti.le ab0ut its
hi.story; but, in all l1kell11ood,

r'.~egara

retaIned its indepondence

during the ten or so years that it spont in the Athenian a.1119.nce,
and so little InJ'luence would h.Ave been felt in its

(~oinaGe.

But we obtain quite strong substantlatlon for If::r.lcydides'
~lccount

in the coinnge of ralph! after the Sacred::iar,

ccrlnaf~e at Boootia after

Euboea after

4h6.

the 1"ev01 t of

447.

~ln

ll...'1d in the

C

t}1.8

o1.:lage of

'l"ha issues of Samoa after th.e ~jarr.:tan ','.ar form

a small history in tho'11801ves.

Fur-thor.'no!'e, numismatics adds to

Thucyd1des' narrative in at least two places, when It tells us
of th~ I:'ecree of C learehu3 In 4.l~9 and its efft:1ctt veneS3 an.:! of
the coinage concessions in the No:rth after the San1.a.r:' ·,';/qr.
we ca."1not ver:i.fy so hifiih

Ii

'jJhlle

percentage of' event!) from this porlod

as we could for the previa'll.3 :)driod treated in chapter two, still
the numismatic evidence

nOW~lera

contradicts Thucydldeu

Ptlrt,hel'1"1ore, while the colnage does p(>int out carta in

h'l tho td.s tory,. these
prl~.nnr:r

see~.

v::;. be in

keepln,~:

chronicle.

:);':11!'H3iollS

wl th J:htlC:rd '1de3 t

concern wi th poll t5.c,0.1 and mill tu:ry hi stOI'j' an.c:. c ;-mld be

reasona.bly defended

trOn'l

tae. t point of view.

At tho presaut s'cago of' our ne,rratlve, we will
\1'11. th

t

r~st

content

poin til::;; out the pSl"alle 11sms between Thucydides flnd r:ul!ils-

mattos.,','e need not exu€'ct them to coincide perfectl:r" hut
will taJ(6 up their

vtU'10U3

w('~

discrepancies in more detail In the
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final chapter of this thesis.

CHAPTER IV
THE HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE: 432-416 B.C.
XClI"

••
I"
'\
,
eO';lV
0" 'f(OheIlO' oux
01{I\CA)V
';0' 1th£OV,
<b.Aa OCl'f(dvT)'.

--Thuc7dides, I, 83, 2.

In the ninth chapter of his second book, Thucydides gives
us a lineup of the parties which would participate in the great
war about to take place.

Thus, in 431, we oan gain some impres ... ·

sion of the size of the Athenian Empire, when we see that its
roster oomprises:
• • • the Chlans, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians
of Naupaetus, most of the Aoarnanians, the Coroyraeans,
the Zaoynthians, and in addition the cities which were
tributary in the following oountries: the seaboard of
Caria, the Dorians adJaoent to the Cartans, Ionia, the
Hellespont, the districts on the coast of Thraoe, ahd
the islands which lie between the Peloponnesus and
Crete toward the east, with the exception of Melos and
Thera. Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Coroyraeans
f'urn1shed ships, the rest infantry and money. Such
were the allies of eaoh si~e and the preparations they
made for the war.1
We can vouch for the aocuracy of this Thuoydidean list in at
leas t some degree by the following evidence taken from coinage.
First .e might divide the list into two parts: the allies
mentioned by name (e.g., the Chiana, Lesbians, etc.) and those

111, 9,

4-6.
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mentioned by
etc.)

The

~egion

fl~st

only (e.g., Carlan seacoast, adjacent Dorians,

sectlon of the 11st,

all, Is made up by what we have

.

comp~ls1ng

elsewhe~e

seven names in

called allles of the

flrst class, namely those enjoylng complete independence and paying no trlbute, but furnishing thelr own ships and

soldie~y.

Chios, the first name 1n this section, was never conquered by
Athens; her coinage remalned contlnuous from the Persian wars
down through the fourth century.

Lesbos was likewise still mint-

ing in 431, and she would continue to do so down to the revolt
which Mllned her 80me three years later.

Plataea was such a

small town that it dld not normally issue coinage during the
fifth century; hence we can find no evidence on either stde here.
The Messenians, after escaping from Ithome, had settled at Naupactus only around 460 and had employed Athenian coinage from the
date of their founding out ot gratitude to their Attie protectors.
Of the towns in Acarnania, only Leucaa and Anactorium were large
enough to issue their own coins during the fifth century; and in
neither of these cities is there seen any decline in minting during the course of the century.

Corcyra has left us a steady

aeries of cow-and-calf coins from 585 B.C. down to 338 B.C.; and
Zacynthus likewise continued to mint her Apollo-tripod pieces
from the sixth through the fourth centuries.

Hence, whatever

allies mentioned by name in this section, if they did issue coinage, continued to do so during the fifth century up until at
least this time--a good indication that they were members in good
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standing among the first-ola8s or independent allie8. 2
On the other hand, when we look at the coinage of the regions
mentioned in the second list, we find that many states which had
minted in earlier days had ceased to do so by 431.
tion a few cities of eaoh

re~ion

by way of example.

We Vlill menIn Caria,

Cheraoneaus, Halicarnassus, Iasus, and Termera had stopped issuing
yet it is noteworthy that Aspendus, Celender!s, and Lycia had not
ceased.

This latter fact is perhaps indicative of the trouble

that -Athens had in controlling Carla, suggested certainly by its
refusal to pay the tribute when an additional levy was attempted
in 428/7 during the revolt of Lesbos.

In the nearby Dorian r e-

gions, Astypalaea, Calymna, Camlrus, Carpathus, Cos, Ialysus, and
Lindus were no longer minting; only Cnldus was allowed to strike
a few coins, but it had been forced to switoh to the Attic standard.

In Ionia, which should probably here be taken in a wide

sense so as to include the Aeolian settlements in northwestern
Asia Minor, Assus, Ephesus, Erythrae, Clazomenae, Colophon, and

2The coinage of the Chians and Lesbians oan be verified from
the tables in Robinson. Chios has merited special consideration
also in Gardner, History, 250-253; Head, Hrstoria Numorum, 599600; and in an artiole of Gardner's: "The Finanoial History of
Ancient Chios," The Journal of Hellenio Studies, XL, (l(20), 160173. A further bfOliography-on the coins of Lasbos wili be found
later 1n this chapter.
The bibliography for the other independent allies is: Flataea
--Head, Ibid., 347; Naupactus.,.-Gardner, History, 285; AoarnaniansHead, ~., 328-334 (though hnactorium itself did not come under
the power of the Athenians untIl six years later); Corcyraeans-Head, ~ •• 325-326; Zaeynth1an8--Head, Ibid., 429.
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Cyme had. stopped; Phocaea, probably one of Athens' eleetrum
cities like Cyzieus,3 Samos, permitted by the special agreement
of 439 mentioned in the last chapter, and Teos retained their
m1.nting privileges.

In the Helle spont I Abydus I ;'\stacus" Cherson-

esus, Dardanus, Lampsaeus, Parium, Selymbria, Seepsis, and Tenedos
were no longer minting; there contlnued only Chalcedon, like
Cnidus forced to issue on the Attic standard, and Cyzicus, Athenst
link with Persian trade.

In the area around Thrace to the north,

Dikaea (Eretria), Dikaea (Abdera), Olynthus of the Chalcidlans,
Peparethos, Potldaea, Samothrace, Sermylia, Scione, Scyros,

Stag~

Terone, and Tinde had stopped; but Abdera, Acanthus, Maronela,
and Neapolis continued through the fifth century--an indication,
as in the case of Caria, that this area was not overly well under
control, since it was one of the first areas to rebel during the
Archidamian War Which was now getting under way.

Also, in line

wi th the concession policy of 439 j Aeneia, Aenos, t:Tende,' and

Thasos had resumed "t.'1.elr previous ly interrupted issues; and so
they too were minting in 4.31.

The final region mentioned by Thucy-

dides in his list is the islands between Peloponnese and Crete,
again probably taken in

Q

larger than the Cyclades.

wide sense to include an area slightly
In this area, we find no coins being

3Phocaea stopped issuing silver coins during the fifth century, probably to preserve the Athenian monopoly in that sphere.
But she was obviously allDwed to go on minting electrum coins and
may have been, like Cyzious, one of Athens' centers for minting
Thaslan gold. (Head, ~., 588-589).

issued at Aegina, Andros, Carthaea, Carystus, Coresia, Delos,
Eretria, Iulis, Naxos, Paros, Serlphos, Slphnos, and Tenos-all of which had previously coined.
in

Thera, though independent

431, was soon badgered into paying tribute by the Athenians.

It is interesting to note that Athens !leld almost complete sway
in this territory, as compared with defaulters in other tribute
areas.

Hence we can in a sense understand her anger against Melos.

which alGne continued to de.fy her authority and remained independent and coining until

416. 4

Henoe we can see that Thuoydides' list of allies and their
relegation to th eir respecti ve groupings as dependent or independent is well substantiated by numismatic evidence.

We might·

even venture to assert that the numismatic picture in some respeots
affords us a clearer view of the condition of the Athenian Empire
In

431, since it indIcates where Athens' power was weak, i.e., in
,

Lycia and Thrace, and where it was strongest, i.e., in the islands.
This was the state of the empire at the commencement of hostilities.

At this point, it might be good for us to reiterate

our purpose in this thesis--not to summarize t.lJ.e history of Thucydides in its entirety, but only

t'~ose

is ala ted parts which deal

with the growth or decline of the Athenian Empire.

Hence in

'~he

following, quite sketchy account of the war itself, we shall make
no mention of such military activities as the Spartan invasions
4The extent of the oessations in coinage among the dependent
allies may be found in Robinson's tables.

of Attioa or various Athenian repr-isals, except where these actions might in some way affect the Empir-e.

Thus we will make no

attempt to sustain a contj.nuous narrative of the

'''laX',

but will

merely strive to analyze a few somewhat scattered events.
In the first three years of the war, 431-429, little of
consequence happened to the empire.
subjects of Athens since

456,

The Aeginetans, already

were for security reasons expelled

in 431 from their- island; and their coinage, which had been slim
for the past quarter-century. ceased entirely.5
in Thraoe capitulated after a siege of two years.

In 430, Potidaea
But this city

was simply an ally in revolt and had issued no coins since 449. 6
The next

b~g

Athenian Empire 1n
in 428.

item of interest to an investigator of the
Thuoy~ides

is the Lesbian revolt, which began

Immediately after the Spartans had staged their annual

invasion of Attica in the spring, the whole island of Lesbos,
except for Methymna,7 revol ted.

'fhis rebellion was not lnspired

5The fate of Aegina is mentioned in II, 27. Her- coins of
this time, besides being covered by the sources mentioned already
in note 29 on page 37, are also treated in Jean Babelon, Catalo~~~
de la Co11eotion de Lu~es: Monnaies Grecgues (2 vols.l Paris,
I92~, II, l09-11~ ne~ert Adolph Cahn, Grieohische MUnzen Arohalseher, Zeit (Basel, 194.1), p. 4; Joseph EckhaI, ,poctrlna borwn Y~ter~ vols.; Vlndobonae, 1792-1839), II, 22~; Ward,-sotr.
6Potidaea and hal' ooinage are mentioned in Thuoydides II, 70;
Bury. 408, Q. A. ~., v, 205; Gardner, Histoty. 280; Head, ~.,
212. (I.e., only the last two souroes refer to coinage.}
7,Methymna had a special al1ianoe with Athens, evidenced by
the Athena-head coins whioh she continued to strike throughout
the war. (Robinson, 331-332).
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by any

ill-treatment of the Lesbians by the Athenians; but the

states on Lesbos, and especla.lly Mltylene, wished to assert
their freedom.

The Lesbians ~lad been listed in 431 by Thucydides

as independent allies and, as a consequence, possessed a large
fleet of their own.

Like Thasos, some thirty-five years earlier,

Lesbos had a good chanoe of succeeding in her revolt; but, because
of the dilatory aid from the Peloponnesians, they could hold out
against the Athenian siage for only one year.
A.thens was vexed w Ith the Lesbians.

They had been allies

on almost an equal footinr, with the Athenians and should have
had no desire to revolt.

Furthermore, they had chosen a par-

ticularly inopportune moment for their action, as far as Athens
herself was concerned--when Attica was being menaced and when
war"f un d s were

•

runn~ng

1 ow.~Po

Consequently, the Athenian assem-

bly decided on the maxitmxm penalty for tho rebels: to kill all
the adul t males and to sell the rest of the population ihto slavery_

On reconsideration, however, of this impassioned decision.

they decided on a more clement course. namely that of taking over
the island in the name of Athens and then renting the territory

8Thucydldes tells us in III. 19, 1-2 that the Athenians had
to levy an extraordinary tribute to meet the added expenses of
the Lesbian campaign. They sent twelve ships around to the
various allies to collect more money. These vessels met with
some success, except in Ca.ris. 'Where the envoys were attacJ~ed and
their le ader killed. MeanwhIle. at home, Athens, desperate with
the length ot siege, levelled her first ta~opd or property tax
to raise more funds for the prosecution of the war against the
recalcitrant Lesbians.

I
I.

I

6$
back to the origInal Lesbian owne1"8.9
Naturally, atter the surrender and subjection of the island,
Mltylene intermitted her abundant issues of both silver and electrum atter 427.

She would resume these only after beIng released

trom the Empire towards the end of the century.10
For the next six years, down to the end of the first decade
of the war, most of the events touching on the Athenian Empire
were small and comparatively insign1f1cant.
port c1ty of COlophon, revolted.

In 427, Notium, the

It was quickly recaptured and

then colon1zed by an Athenian commission.

Notium, as a port city,

had issued no colns herselt, but had been employing the coins of
Colophon, which had stopped after the Decree of Clearchus. l1
Also 1n 427, the island ot Minoa 1n tront of Megara was captured and fortified by the Athenians) it was too small to issue

colnage. 12 Corc,-ra too,one of the Independent allies, was In a
state of Internal turm.oil thN>ugh dissension between

the~ollgarchsJ

I,

I

9Th. historical 81de ot the Lesbian revolt Is handled In

Thucydide., III, 2-19 and 25-29; B~y, 413-4171 £. A. y., v, 213218) Charles Norris Coohrane, Thuoydide! and theSo!ence of Hls!2.r.! (Oxford, 1929), 123-121.U Hermann Mill!er-nraSlng, "!h"ii&araeTioh~ ~or8~hunsel (Wlen, 1881), 149-0154.
lOsouroes on Mltylenian coinage are: Gardner, Historz, 253E!olntlon ot
00ln ~.s TCiiiibridge, 1916}, P,P. 14-15, Robinson,' 11r"3,j!hWard ,
Il54=1 I and Warwiok Wroth, Catalosse ot. .tM Grii i Coins .2! Troas,
AGolis, and Le.bos
.... (London, 1894), pp.-rxrr=lxv •

2551 Head, Ibid., 557-5591 George MacDonald,

---;..;;;..;;

llThuoydldes, III,
graphy tor Notlum.

34;

In!

Head, ~.J 569-570 torm the biblio-

12Minoa is mentioned in III, 51.
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who were pro-Peloponnesian, and the democrats, who were pro-Athenian.

The Athenian party eventually won out; and Corcyra remained
independent as berore. l ) In the same year, Plataea fell after
a long siege; and her remaining cit1zens fled to Athens. 1 4 As
mentioned above, though an independent ally, she was too small to
issue her own coins.

And, late 1n the summer, an Athenian fleet

left for Sicily, ostensibly to help the natives of Leontini and
their allies, who were Ionians, being oppressed by the Doric
Syracusans. 15
While in Sicily during the next year,
two new adherents to the Athenian cause.

426, this fleet gained
Messene and Mylae, a

town belonging to the Messenians, submitted to Athenian troops.
Since these cities revolted the very next year, we cannot tell
whether or not their capture had any effect upon their coinage. 16
The year 426 also marked an abortive attempt to capture
Melos.

An Athenian force landed and ravaged the island:

But the

Melians, sare in their walled city, defied the superior forces an
retained the1r liberty. The Athenians soon withdrew. l7

421;

13Corcyra's sedition is treated in: III,
~., V, 220-222.

£. !.

69-85;

Bury, 419-

14 Pla taea t s last stand is recorded in III, 52-68;
V, 219-220.
15 111, 86.
16 111 , 90.
11111, 91.

£. A. g.,

In the same year, troubles broke out In Ambracia and Acarnania in the western part of Greeoe on either side of the Ambraci
Gulf.

The Athenians and the Peloponnesians intervened to help

their favorite contestants.

But soon, the Ambraciots, the allies

of the Peloponnesians, were worsted.

A treaty which provided for

a peace of one hundred years' duration for this territory was
then concluded; but the truce excluded Ambracian Anactorium. 18
In the following year,

425, Messene and Mylae successfully

revolted from Athena, being helped by Syracuse and other Lacedaemonian

allies. 19

Then Anactorium was taken by the A'thenians

and the Acarnanians.

But this city, which was sltuated just a

rew miles east from the later famous Actium, seems to

r~ve

passed

under the control of the Acarnanians and hence did not cease its

colnage. 20
Likewise in
tribute lists.

425 sweeping ohanges were made in the Athenian

Although no now crisis is implied by

th~

Thucy-

didean narrative, the quota lists from the Acropolis tell us that
the former exactions were in most instanoes doubled or even
trebled at this time.

Also about one hundred new names were added

to the lists, includIng the formerly recalcitrant Melos.

18The di ff ieul ties in Ambrac ia and Aearnania are tree. ted in
III, 102 and 105-114; Bury, 422-423; £. !. ~., v, 227-230.
19The early defection of Messene and My1ae is told in IV, 1.

425.

20The capture of Anactorium is mentioned in IV, 1+9; Bury,
The coins are rererred to by Head, ~., 329.

I
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This would seem to pose two difficulties wi th Thucydides'
account.

First, he implies in his treatment of the con-:-tuest of

Malos in book five that the year L.. 16 marked the
Athenian attempt to subdue that island.

f

irat successful

Secondly, Thucydides

does not even hint at a reason why such excessive increases in
tribute should have been demanded.
In sol ving the first of these problems, we should remark
that the financial records of the Athenians are official documenta; and hence their reliability as objective evidence would
seem to be highly preferable to that of Thucydides.

They would

have no pOint to be gained by falsification, While the same
could not be sa.id of a literary historian.
difficulty is relatively simple.
Thucydides are at faul t.

The solution to this

Neither the documents nor

The documents merely record the assess-

ment made and not necessarily its payment; thus there 1s no evidence that Melos ever paid at all.
that many of the names added in

425

,

And it is generally assumed
to the quota lists were just

a matter of wishful thinking on the part of the Athenians and that
those who were not forced to pay did not do so.

Hence a record

of assessment with no record of payment plus the continuing coinage of the island would hardly seem to indict Thucydides of fraud
in any sense. 2l

21The tribute lists of

425

are treated in Bury, 428-429;
~., III, 288.289.

£. !. g., V, 236.231) Meritt, !. 1.

As to the second problem, the

obvious.

SUlSwep

is aga.in reasonably

After seven seasons of unabated warfare, tl18 Athenian

finances would 'naturally be ruxming loW', supporting as they were
at least

t}~ee

separate theaters of operation.

vised tribute list need not surprise anyono.

Hence the re(frle fact that

Thucydides does not mention the crisis, e.s he had trw provious
finanoial difficmltles during the revolt of Lesbos, may stom from
the faot that t'1e add! tional money was raIsed t..'lrourh tho ord1.nary ohannels of tribute, which ho seldom

~~ntlons,

while the

Lesbian monGY had been obtained tnroupJ'\ an exceptional property
tax of the Athenian people.
During the years

425

and

424,

Attlens began capturing small

"va.ntage points around the Peloponne.e whichwould enable her
raiders to strike deep into Spartlin territory.

ancient Pylos in

425

and took over the island of Cythera, slightly

southeast of the Laoonian Gulf, in
not

~urNntly

She fortified

424.

Pylos, of oourse, was

inhabited and issued no ooins.

Cythera did not

begin to mint her own ourrency until the third oentury before
Christ.

Henoe

W6

are unable to verify e1 ther of these small ac-

quisitions. 22

22Pylos and Cythera might not be class5.fled as belonglnc
striotly to the Empire. s~.noo they were captured ohiefly for
strateg10 reasons. Cythera pa1d little tribute; Pylos could not.
Pyloa 1s treated in IV. 3 ft.; Bury. 429-438; c. A. g •• v, 230235. Cythera Is treated in IV. 53-;;7; Bury. 4!B: Q.. i. li., V.
23 8 -2391 hett coins in Head. Ibld., 4.3t>.
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Beginning also in 424, when the supreme strategist of Sparta,
the eeneral Brasidas, began his operations in the regions around
Thrace, the Athenians suffered a series of reverses in this
northern area.

First, Acanthus and Stagira, fired by Spartan

promises of aid, staged suocessful revolts In 424.
whose strength had probably

~lven

Aoanthus,

it special consideration with

regard to the Decree of Clearehus, since it had never stopped
minting, went off the Attic standard at this time and adopted
the Phoenician standard for its bull-and-lion colns.

This stan-

dard was much more useful for trade with the East, especial11
in the faoe of the waning power of Athens in the northern area.
Stagira did not resume her ooinage until the fourth oentury.23
At this point in his narrative, Thucydides relates another
Athenian attempt to gain Boeotia, whioh failed. 24
Before the year

424

was over, the historian himself makes

his principal appearanoe 1n the pages of his history, in connection with further events in the Thracian region.

The Spartan

Brasidas, together with his newly acquired northern allies .. made
an expedition against Amphipolls, an Athenian colony on the river
Strymon, a few miles inland from Eion. 25

Both Elon and Amphipolis

were at this time the responsibility of the general Thucydides,
the

eo~~ander

of the northern distriot, who was stationed at

23Aoanthus an~. ~taglra are treated in IV. 8L-88; Bury, h16!. !., V, 244; Aoanthus' ooins in Heaa, ~., 204-205.

447; £.

24 IV , 89-101.
25

&
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Thaaos--a distance ot half a day away by boat.

One cold. snowy

night. Brasldas found the bridge to Amphipolls not well guarded
and the city generally unprepared for an attaok.

He quiokly

manned the bridge and proceeded to assault the town itself.

The

people at once sent out a message to Thucydidea to oome to their
rescue.

He sailed 1mmediately after receiving the news and ar-

rived at the mouth of the Strymon on the evening of the next day.
Meanwhile. the people of Amphipolis, unaware that Thucydides
was so near at hand with help, had surrendered to Brasidas.
Thucydldes, however, managed to preserve Elon by hls timely arrival. a rew short hours before Brasldas marched there too.

It

was the dlsgrace attendant on the loss of the Athenian Amphlpolis
through insufficient guarding that oaused the exile of 'l'hucydides
and was indirectly responsible for the writing of the history that
we possess. 26
Beoause Amphipolls was a colony of the Athenians themselves,
it had utilized the regular Athenian money before this date.
And now in 424. even after its autonomy--for Sparta did not make
it a Spartan subject, but allowed it freedom. i.e., freedom to

26Brasidas was a clever general. He 1mew that Thucydides
was in the neighborhood and that he had the ri~~t of working the
gold mines in that part of Thrace (inherited from Olorus, his
father) and hence probably possessed some influence wi th t1:le
natives of cities around Amphipolls, and, as a result, would be
able to collect a sizable force to oppose him.
Therefore Brasidas struck quickly, offered easy tO~18, and
accepted the surrender of Amphipolis while its people were still
somewhat irresolute.

72
fight with 3parta--it did not begin immediately to strike coins.
Only after its independence was definitely established by the
treaty of Nloias 1n 421, did it begin the issue of the beautiful
Arethusa-head pieces, which have won universal acclaim for their
high artistic value. 27
After these losses, Athens was beginning to become worried
about the future of the northern section of her Empire.

And so,

to have time to strengthen her position, she concluded in the
spring of 423 a one-year truce with Sparta.

Athens hoped in this

way to be abl e to make leisurely prepara tiona to regain her los t
territory 1n Thraoe, while BrasIdaa would be hindered from fomenting any further revolts.

And, on the other hand, Sparta hoped

that perhaps durIng the course of the year Athens would be willing
to negotiate a peace treaty of longer duration. 28
But before the news of the tl"'Uce reached the north, Brasldas
had already helped Scione to revolt.

The Athenians clarmed that

the rebellion had taken place after the actual date of the armistice and demanded that the town be handed back.

Brasidas, in-

sisting that the revolt had taken place before the treaty, refused.

And Mende, a town on the same peninsula, encouraged by

27Amphipol1s 1s mentioned in IV, lJ2-108j Bury, 447-448;
.2,. A, • .!!., v, 244-245; Ca.vaignac, LtEcono!n&,! Grecgl1e (Paris, 1951),
p. 93. Its coins are treated in ~ardner, History, 274-280; Head,
Ibid., 214-217.

451:

28 The truce of 423 is mentioned in IV, 11'(-119; Bur;)", 450-

Q. !. ~.,

v, 246.
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Brasidas' resolute stand, took this opportunity to join in the
revolt.

Bras1das accepted this town into the Spartan alliance,

charging at the same time that the Athenians had violatedt;he
truce in other rna tters.
At this juncture, the future of the northern Empire might
have taken an entirely different turn, had not Brasidas been
called away to battle some nat! ve Macedonians further to the north.
Deprived of help, Mende once more fell into Athenian hands; and
Scione was circumvallated and held in a state of siege by an
Ath~nian

guard.

It fell about two years later, and an anpry

Athens slew all its males and enslaved the women and children.
For its brief period of freedom, however, it resumed its minting
which it had stopped in

449.

Mende, however, even after its pre-

sent troubles with the imperial c1ty, continued its coinage prtvileges; but it had amays employed the Attic standard, and this
might explain some of Athens' leniency towards it. 29
In 422, when the truce of the preceding year had formally
expired, Glean, the general responsible

fOl"

the si.'mal ;\thenian

success at Pylas three years earlier, led an expedition to recover
Amphipolls.

In the subsequent battle for possession of the city,

both he and Bras1das were killed~O Thus, althouph the Athenian

;..;.

29S c ion8 and Mende are referred to in IV, 120-129; ~ury, 4si ..
1~eir coins are treated 1n Robinson,-

451:,; Q. A. R., v, 246.247.
33l~33S.

30 The battle at Amphipolis in 422
Bury, 453-455; Q. !. !., v, 248.

1s mentioned in V, 6-11;
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troops were routed, tho Peloponneslan victory amounted to a
practical defeat because of' the

deat~

of their leader.

Also, wi t

the death of Cleon, the war pa.rty at Athens was considerabl:.'"
weakened; and the peace faction, with Nicias at their head, was
easily

~ble

to conclude a more lasting treaty in the following

year.
This treaty of

421,

which was supposed to inaugurate an era

of peace which would last for fifty years, had the following
terms arrectlng the Empire: (1) Athens would restore Pylos,
Cythera, and a few other small posts to Sparta, but would retain
Anactorium, Nlsaea, and Sollion; (2) Sparta would restore Amphipolis, Stacira, Acanthus, and some other small towns in Thrace
to Athens; (3) Boeotia would restore the fortress of Panacton
to the Athenians; (4) the

tOv.,.11S

mentioned in section two above

would remain independent, but would pay tribute to Athens.3 1
•

But it was obvious at once that this peace CQu1c, not be
durable.

Three large and il"1portant states in tho

alliance rejected the terms of the agreement.

Pelc~ponne.sian

Corinth did

~ot

like the idea of Anactorlum, her colony, being l{ept by the
Athenians.

Boeotia. did not want to surrender Pnnacton with

nothing gained in return.
remaining in Athenian

Megara did not fancy her port Nisaea

h~~ds.

Furthermore, the Chalcidians re-

fused to surrender Amphipolis; so most of the condi tions of the

31For the complete terms of this treaty confer V. 17 ..20.
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original treaty bogged down. 32
Sparta, however, was anxious, to get back hflr prisoners
from the battle of Sphacteria., where 292 of her men ha.d surrendered
to the Athenians.

She was also eager to put aside all enmity

with Athens because her treaty with Argos, her old rival on the
Peloponnese, was soon to run out; and she did not relish the
idea of having to wage two all-out wars.

Athens, on the other

hand, wan ted an end of Spartan tampering in her .Empire.

two states made a separate treaty: Athens agreed to
captives wit rl Sparta, but kept Pylos and Cythera.
alliance,

whi~~

So the

excha~ee

With this

was also supposed to last fifty years, ended

the first ten years of war.33
The treaty was reasonably successful in maintaining peace
for a period of a bout five years.

During this time Sparta and

Argos clashed at the battle of Mantinea in
Athenians aided the Argives.

h18,

where the

Both were routed by the Spartans.

After this defeat, a revision was made in the government of Argos;
and that state's new foreip:n policy was responsible for an alllancs with Sparta.
ally, Sparta regained

With the addition of this new, powerful
som~

of her prestige lost

a~

Sphacteria;

and many of the other towns among her friends in tho Peloponnese_
who had refused to support her in her treaty of' h2l, bep;an once

3 2 Por the re.1 e e ti on of the firs t trea ty , confer V, 22 •
. 33For the final treaty confer V, 22-25. For both treaties,
455-459; 2.. t::.. !i., V, 249-256.

see also Bury,

4

more to rally behind her. 3

Then, in the year

416,

ocourred the Malian affair.

As has

been remarked earlier in this chapter, Melos was at thll"! time the
one island in the Cyclades that was still standinr.r, firm 8.9;ainst
the dominq,t.1on of Athens.
by the Athenians

w.tt~

Its solitary aloofness VIas reGa.rded

mixed feelings of indiznatlon and hatred.

They felt that it stood as a bad example to the other islands,
who mir-llt be encouraged by its independent ex13tence to holt from

the1.r roles as dutiful sub.1eots.
At this point in the narratIve, Thucydides entertains us
with that litera!'y masterpieoe which has become known as the
Malian Dialogue.

In that interohange of speeohes, supposedly

!,9corded when p!'ior to invas.1 on the Athenian envoys had fore-

warned the Malians of the advantages of a bloodless surrender of
their isand, he skillfully portrays the arguments nnd emotions
on both sides.

The Athenian Jpp,~ exhibited 'on this occasion

has often been inte!'preted as the tragic flaw of the main characters of this Thucydidean trr3!sdy;35 and the Mellans fru!.tlessly

appealed to mo!'al arguments of' justice and !'icpt to

sta~r

the

hands of the empire builders.

34Also in 417, Athens made another unsuccessful attempt to re-

A ninor revolt of Dlum on ~,~t •. ~ thos
also occurred (V, tl2); but tJ"lis town did not issue coins, and
Thucydides tells us nothing of the outcome of the revolt.

gain Amphipolis (V l 83).

3.5Confer John H. Pinley, Jr., Thucyclides (Cambrdl~e, 1942),
pp. 321 ft. for a balanoed treatment of the element of tragedy
in the his toria.n' s narra ti ve.
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Unfortunately for the Malians, the Spartans at this time
were still conscientiously observ1ngthe truce and thus did not

w:ish to help the islanders, though they were originally Lacedaemonian colonists.
taken.

'!he hapless city was surrounded, besieged, and

As on other aU8plclous oeoas ions,

th(;}

it thanlans r.lassacred

all the adult Males and. sold the weaker !nhabi tants as :slaves_
They then proceeded to colonize tho island
Thus, a1'tor

h16,

themselves,,~~J

the old pomegranate clvic coinare of :<0108,

the only vestige of' 1ndependence le.ft 1n the islands, disappeared.

It would be resumed, however, after 400, vmen

Lysa!~er

restored

a remnant o.f the orig1nal population to their home. 37
Recapitulating the events of the years 431-416, co~~only

spoken of as the Ax-ohldamia.n :Var and the Peace of Nic1as, 1s not
any easy task.

Many happenings whioh touched upon the b..mplre

were too small ;to leave an impression on co1nage,

e.~i.,

the fall

of Plataea, the revolt of' N'ottura, the capture of Minoa, 'Cythera,

and Pylos.

And other events were of too brief duration to achieve

any such effect, e.g., the domination over Messana and ?F.ylae

in SicIly.

Yet, none,·lass, certain oocurrences did leave thelr

traces in co:1nar,e--the depopulatIon of JI.ee:lna, the revolt of Lasbos, the secession of' Acanthus, the successful

stru~gle

of Amphl-

36Th.e his tory of ~<!elos is

£.. 11- li.,

1"'818. ted in V, 84-116; Bury, 1~62V, ~2Al; Cocllrane, 113-114_

37The coins of Melos are lIsted in Qtu'dner HlstorJ.;, 21+4Head, ~., 486-487; Hoblnson, 329 and 33~; Weil, 362-361+_
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polis for independence, and the crushing of Melos.

And once

again we may state that the numismatic evidence does not contra ..
dict the account of Thucydldes, but even in some instances, e.g.,
the relative power of Athens :In certain areas in 431, and tho tribute increases of 42$, supplements the historical narrative.

CHAPTER V
THE HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIHE:
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--Sophocles, Oedipus Rex,
883-888.
During the winter of

416/5, the Athenian people were feeling

confident after their reoent triumph at Melos.

Throughout six

years of peace their revenues had continued to pile up until
their treasury now possessed a considerable surplus.

Under these

conditions they felt safe in disobeying Pericles' wise counsell
not to expand their Empire during war.
sure that they could be

88. -t.:-l

For they were not even

to be a.t war, s inca the treaty wi th

Sparta had been effeotive over such a long period of time.
The opportunity for the Athenians to use their savings came
towards the end of

416. Segesta, a city in SiCily, had been at

war with her more powerful southern neighbor, Selinus.

Coming

orf second best in the contest did not please the Segestians, so

!
II

I
11

they deoided to call on the Athenians for help.

111,

They got the

I,

65. 1.
19

I

1 '

II

"

r
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democrats trom Leontini, the rormer allies or the Athenians who
had been responsible ror the earlier imperial expedition to the
~sland

in

427, to back their petition and sent a legation to

Athena requesting aid.

At the same time, they ofrered to pay

any expenses that an Athenian expedition

mir~t

incur.

As a result of this visit, Athenian envoys were sent out to
inVestigate the financial position of the Segestians, to ascertain whether or not they could arford to support a fUll-fledged
Athenian expedition in the manner to
customed.

~hich

they had beoome ac-

The Athenian exploratory envoys were entertained lavUh-

ly in Sagesta and returned home bearing tales of

~~told

wealth.

It was only later that the Athenians discovered that many or the
solid gold vessels seen in the temples were really gilt silVer
and that the sumptuous service used in the homes of the private
citizens of Segesta had been passed from house to house between
entertainments on each

nl~pt.

Furthermore, the Segestians had

borrowed from many of the neighboring cities in Sicily silver and
gold vessels to impress the Athenian emissaries.

trhe ruse worked.

The Athenians fitted out 134 triremes and an even larger number
of smaller attendant vessels and sailed westward for what looked
like a glorious chance to expand their Empire.
It is hard to see how such an expedItion could have failed
so completely and so miserably.

The Sicilians and especially the

Syracusans, on whom the brunt of the defensive war eventually
eVolved, were not prepared for war and could hardly have had on
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hand anywhere near the resources that Athens could muster.
fail the expedition did.

But

It lingered for over two years on the

island and finally perished 1n its entirety, dragging with it
even more numerous reinforcements both of ships and men t ha thad
been sent out froM Attica froM time to time.
Several reasons, however, c an be pointed out for tl1is failure.

There was, of course, t."'1e actual poverty of the

discovered only after the expeditionary force had made
journey.

S~gestians,
~le

long

Then, the Italian allies of the Athenians, on whose

help they had been counting to some extent, refused to embroil
themselves In a war against Selinus and Syracuse.

Then too, a

large portion of the blame could be fixed on Nicias, the commanding general for the greater part of the campaign.

As we saw in

the last chapter, Nicias was a member of the peace party; and he
was highly reluctant to embark on the enterprise even when the
Athenian people had elected him a general.

•

His co-commander,

the young Alcibiades, was supposed to provide the spark for the
forces; but he was recalled to Athens early in the

campai~n

to

stand trial for the mutilation of the Hermae and fled to Sparta
when he found that he was more than likely to be condemned.
Nicla.s, left in charge of the expedition, assorted his cautious
nature only enough to take smaller cities like Catana and deferred
the attack on Syracuse, the main objective, until that city had
built up an adequate defense.

And even when he eventually did

invest the city, he delayed a.ction until the Syracusans had
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built a counter-wall around him and there was no loncer any hope
of victory.

The final piece of hesitation on his part ca.me when

an unpropitious eclipse of the moon occurred on the nlr:ht when
he should have evacuated his troops by boat from his surrounded

fortiflcat ions; this las t delay cost '-Athens the vthole Sicilian
.force and afforded Syracuse its unparalleled victory in L;13. 2
Some aspects of the SIcilian campaign are reflected in the
island's coinage of the period.

Syracuse at itl lowest ebb, when

surrounded by Athenian and hostile Sicilian forces,3 was forced
to issue wbat is commonly termed gold money of necessity, that is,
coins put out by melting down temple vessels--a last resort in
a city that normally issued silver.4

Then, after its decisive

Victory, it oelebrated its triumph by issuing beautiful silver
pieoes, whioh deserve to rank among the finest in the artistic
world and which call to mind the even more skillfully exeouted
Demareteia issued by the city after Himera in 480.

These ten-

drachm medallions, with their heads of Persephone, their lifelike
four-horse chariots, and the water-nymph Arethusa encircled by
dolphins, were done by the Sicilian artists Cimon and Evaenetus,
who Bury says "may claim to stand in the same rank as Phidias. ,,5

2The history ot the Sicilian expedition is treated in Thucydides VI-VII; Bury, 477-485; Q. !. i., V, 282-311.

3VII,
ye arB

48, 5.

4The same thing would happen to a besieged Athens some six
la ter •

5n

liB},
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Head spends two full pages describing these masterpieces. 6
Two other cities in Sicily likewise reflect an interesting
change in their coinage at this time.

Catana, whiCh Thucydides

tells us was one of the Athenian bases of operations against
Syracuse, minted after its capture in

415

coins during the Athenian occupation. 7

some of its finest

And even Segesta seems

to have put forth some of its best coins with many striking
varieties between the years 415 and 409. some would sea here the
hand of a borrowed Athenian artist at work. 8
During his narrative of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides
g-ives us a list of the all les of the Empire who were fighting
with the Athenians before Syracuse.

This document Is too lengthy

to quote hero in its entirety because the historian intersperses
some commentary along with many of the names.

We can, however,

quote the individual districts mentioned by Thucydides as al11es
at this time and confer their coinage records to whether we can
subs.tantlate his list as we dld for the one of 431 in chapter

6The coins of Syracuse are treated 1n Comparetti 28.29;
Gardner, History, 4oS; Head, Historia ~umorum, 171-178; G. F.
Hill, aistorica1 Greek Coins lLondon, 1906), p. 54; MacDonald,
Coin TYpes, 9. C. T. §e1tman, Masterpieces, 18-20; Alfred von
~a11et, ~ Ant~ken MQpzen (Berlin, 1909), pp. lS-lB.

7The coins of Catana are discussed in Gardner, Ibid., 282Head, l£!S., 132-133.
8The coins of Segesta are mentioned in Gardner, ~., 284Head, Ibid., 164-167.
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four. 9
He

fi~st

mentions the Lemnians and Imbrians, two islands

in the Thraclan tribute area.

Lemnos struck no

coi~s

after the

Persian wars until out from under Athenian domination towards the
beginning of the fourth century.

Imbros did not begin coining

until the fourth century, so we can verify nothing from her issues.

Then Thucydldes lists the people from Aegina and Hestlaea,

who were Athenian colonists since the original inhabitants had
been expelled from these places In 431 and

446

respectively;

both had ceased to issue coins after theIr depopulation, as we
mentioned in the preceding chapters.
The next group listed--the Eretrlans, Chalcidians, StJTians,
and Carystlans--were all from Euboea.

They had issued no coins

after the suppression of their revolt in
tioned.

446,

as previously men-

But, in 411, after becoming united and with promised
•

Spartan aid, they would revolt; and Eretria would inaugurate a
series of federal coinage for the whole island.
The Ceans, Andriana, and Tenians were from the islands.
Ceans had switched to the Attic standard after

449;

The

and, except

for the festival coins for Triopian Apollo, which we alluded to
before, they ceased minting.

They would resume on their old

standard in the fourth century.

After 480, the Andrians and the

Tenlans issued no coins during the period of Athenian supremacy
in the Aegean.
9The list of allies before Syracuse is in VII. 51. 2-11.
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The Mileslans, Samians, and Chians were from Ionia.

The

Milesians had been permitted by the Athenians to issue small
coins for local oiroulation only during most of the fifth century.

They

w~ld

begin issuing larger denominations a8ain in

the fourth century.

'!'he Samians had a speoial coinage arrange-

ment with the Athenia.ns, as \,e noted after their rebellion in

41+0-439.

The Chians, as 'l'hucydldes reminds us in th13 pa.ssage I

supplied ships and were independent.

Hence there is no traoe of

Athenian domination on the coinage of this island.
The Methymnaeans, Tenedians, and the people from Aenoa were
all Aeollans.
remained

The Methymnae!lns, the one group on J..Iesbos that ha.d

fai~hful

the period from

to Athens, issued little (if an0 coinage during

420

to

to use Athenian coin.

405,

probably findlnr, it more convenient

They supplied ships and always retained

the right of coinage, even if they did not always exercise it •
lNe noted above that the head of Athena sometimes appeared• on
their coins.

The Tenedians issued no coins from 480 until the

fourth oentury.

The city of Aenos had not minted fz-om

44.9

to

lj.39 because of the decree, but had been allowed to resume coinage
after 439 with other cities of the north.
The Rhodians are here grouped together, a lthough they were
not federated until 409--the official date for the founding of
the city of Rhodes.

Camirus

h~d

Issued didrachms and drachms on

the Aeginetan standard, but had ceased mintIng around

465

when

Athenian ascendancy in southwest Asia Minor was at its height
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after the battle of Eurymedon.

Lindus had formerly minted on the

Phoenician standard, but, under Attic supremacy, issued only a
few hemidrachms and obols of Athenian weight.

Ialysus had also

employed the Phoenician standard in the sixth century; and it is
doubtful whether it issued any staters after

465.

All in all,

coinage on the island was very scarce during the Athenian Empire.
The Cytherians lived on a small island and, as noted before,
issued coins only during the third and second centuries.

The

Cephallenians and Zacynthians went as independent allies and hence
showed no coinage restrictions.

Cephallenia used the coins of

Corcyra, and the coins of Zacynthus show no break during this
period.

The Corcyreans had always been strong independent allies

of Athens, ann their'coins are continuous from 585.

The Messen-

lans from Naupactus and Pylos used Athenian coins, as mentioned
earlier, out of gratitude to their benefactors.
The next groups listed were for the most part voludteers or
mercenaries and do not reflect any determinate policy of their
native ctty--the exiles from Megara. Argives, Mant1neans, Arcadians, Cretans, and Aetolians.

No reflection of their move-

ments would be vis ible in numlsma tics.

The Thurlans and Meta-

pontians b 0 ttl went only because they were forced to by party
dissensions within t.'letr own cities; and, if they refused,
Athens mif:ht come .and ta.ke over the towns completely during
their faction.

They retained their sovereignty by their coopera-

tion, and no break in the coinage of either is noted.

II

III··

I
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or

the Sioilians who were Greeks, the Naxiana and Catanians

are listed.

The Naxians do not seem to have been molested by

the Athenians, a 1 though they did begin new looal issues in 415.
The Catanians have been treated amply above on page 83.

Of the

Sicilians who were barbarians, the Segestians were noted above
on page 83; and the Sioels are a rather indeterminate group of
towns--the statement of Thucydides is indefinite.

It 1e probably

true that none of the more primitive inhabitants of Sicily minted
at this date, as might be lnferred from Head's treatment of
Sicily in Historia Numorum. 10
The final groups mentioned by Thucydides are agnin fragmentary a.nd would have had no influence on the coinage of
respeotive oities.

t.~eir

So the 'ryrrhenians and Iapygians '.vho par-

ticipated in the siege of Syracuse must remain unverified from
our present standpoint. 11
Yet all these allies achieved nothing in Slcl1y.

•

Many of

them perished with their Athenian leaders; and the few towns that
they had ViOn passed ba.ck once more into the hands of the antiAthenian Sicilia.ns.
losses.

The Athenians themselves had suffered severe

Well over two hundred of their ships had been burned or

~---------.-----

lOpp. 114-191.
11 The chief source for the ~leririca tion of the list of allies

~s B. V. Head, Historla Numorum, where articles on each of the
~1 ties are lIs ted separately.
Additional s ourees for Chios oan

pe found on page 60, note 2. Head's acoount of Rhodes was supplemented by Gardner's IUs torI, 255-256.

~
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sunk, and

thei~

manpower was permanently impaired.

Meanwhile, back in (treece, Alcibia.des had deserted to the
Spartans.
fo~tirY'

ll'here he aided tho1r cause by 3t'tggestin.r: tha.t they

Deceleia, a small torm about thirty miles nort'IJ. of' Athens.

This place would afford a haven for runaway sla vas from the Athenian silver mines at
single night.

Laur1~,

since they could

reac~

it in

~

In this way, the necessary manpower for Athens'

coin output could be diminished; and her war effort would become
seriously crippled.

Sparta followed this advice of Alcibiades

and fortified Deceleia in March 413.

The cruelly treated slaves

hastened to this station; and, by the end of that year, the mines
~t Laurium, for all practical purposes, had ceased to oporate. 12

With the Spartans thus harassing the Athenians at Deceleia.
the news of the utter destruction of the land and sen. forces at
Sicily reached Athens.

The populace was

for a tirr!e incredulous,
•

refusing to believe 1hat such a doom could have befallen what had
seemed an almost invinoible oontinr:ent.

:1hen finally they were

convinoed, they wasted no time on self-pity, but at once set
about building more a hips nnd nr-epar1ne to defenc t!1e ir ;:;:n1pire
to the end. l )
The next year, 412, found most of the Athenian subjects

12Decelela is mentioned in Thucydides chiefly in VI, 91, 6;
VII, 19, Ii and VII, 27. It is also treated in Bury, 485; Gardne~
!isto~, 231-232.

13VIII,

1-4.

ready to revolt.

Alclbiades and the Spartans, v;,ho were no longer-

so conoerned wi th keopine the truoe wi th a weat::ened (,thana, were
more than anxious to make the most of this disposition which was
becoming prevalent in the Empire.

a

Spart~l

So Alclbladea and Chalcideus,

general, toured the Aegean world that year, indUcing

Chios, Clazomenae, and Miletu,s to revolt from the Athenians.
Chios 1n turn convinced the whole island of Lasbos to rebel, including both Mltylene and Methymna.l4
Athens acted quickly.

She came unexpectedly and swiftly

won baok Mltylene, Methymna, and Clazomenae.

But then Cnldus,

apprised of the fact that a large Peloponnesian fleet was 1n the
area, also revolted.

And the Chlana, as yet unchecked, sailed

to Camtrus on Rhodes and stirred up the whole island to revolt

b~

fore Athens could arrive to stem the tlde. 1.5
These ovents ot 412 were to some extent mirrored in the con-

temporary colnagc. l6

Of course, Methyrma, '~:ttyl6ne, and' Clazo-

m.nae had been tree for too short a time to permit any changes

in this regard.

Chlos, always an independent ally, had been

141n book eight, Thuoydldes treats t!ie revolts of these
cltles in thet'ollowing chapters: Chios (14), Clazomenae (14. 23).
Mlletus (11), Lesboa (22, 23).
15The recapture or Clazomenae and Leabos are mentioned In
VIII, 23. The revolt of Cnldus 1s given In VIII, 35 and that or
Rhodes 1n VIII, 44. Bury treats these and the preceding revolts
on pages 481-4~BJ £. A.
1n V, 312-315.

n.

l6Ephesus $1180 revolted either now or a year or two earlier,
a. she begins issu1ng c01n. again. This 1* found 1n Gardner,
H1.tgrz. 251-258; Head, H!ltor1" 511-513; Robinson, 330-331.
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issuing throughout the fifth oentury, but her output seems to
inorease in volume during the last fifteen years or so of the
oentury.

Cnidus resumed her coins in 412 on the Phoenician

standard, after thirty-seven years of issuing on the Attic.
the same time, we

lalOW

At

tha t Cyme must also have revolted during

412, from her resumption of hes eagle coinage; Thuoydides does
not mention her revolt, though he implies that 1 twas al ready a
free oity in VIII, 31,

4.

Rhodes did not take advantage of her

freedom at onoe, but started to issue coins only after the
federal union of her three principal c1ties three years later. 17
Thus, in the spring of 411, the last year of the war narrated by Thucydides, the Athenian Empire was 1ntact only in its
northern regions and the Hellespont.

All that remained of 1m-

portance around the western coast of Asia Minor was Lesbos,
Samos, Cos, and Halicarnassus.

Furthermore, Athens was faced

with the harsh reality of a strong Peloponnesian fleet operating
openly in the Aegean, supported by a still hostile Persia and
even by some Sicilian recruits, who had reoently beoome interested
in the outoome of this war in the East.
11Tb.e coinage of the cities revolting in 412 are treated in
the following: (1) Chios--Giesecfe, 68-75; Friedrioh Imhoof-Blumar
Zur Oriechisehen und RSm!sohen Munzkunde (Geneva, 1908) pp. 79~ Ward, 109-110; besides the sources in note 2, page ~o; (2) C
zomenae--Head, Histori~, 567; (3) Mlletus--Gardner, li1story, 251)
Head, Ibid., 584-5851 (4) Lesbos, ~.ethymna and M1tylene--oonfer
note 1, page 03 and note 10, page 65; (5) Cn1dus--Gardner, Ib1d.,
258, Head, j~gd., 614-615; Robinson, 331; (6) Rhodes, Gardner,
.!bid., 255J Head, Ca tal.2B!!! .2! !h!. Greek Coins .2! Qaria, CO"
~hod!!, eig. (London, 1~971, PP. o-oii1; (1) Cyme--Head, Histor1a
Nu.morum, 5 1-552.
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Late in the spring even the little left to Athens began to
revolt.

In the Hellespont, Abydus went over to the Persians and

was followed two days later by Lampsacus.

Once again the Athe-

nians sailed quickly and retook Lampsacus, but failed to recapture Abydus,18 which from that year began its famous representations of Nike, Apollo, and Artemis in gold--the chief

moneta~

exchange of the Persian world. 19
In June 411, there was trouble in the city of Athens itself.

The populace was becoming dissatisfied with the way in which the
war was being conducted under the democracy.

An oligarchic in-

surrection took place, and little resistance was offered to the
new p::overnment of the

:B~our

Hundred.

But, instead of solving the

difficulties rampant in the vanishing Empire. the new government
only increased them.

As the democrats had done before them, the

oligarchs favored their own brand of government in all the states
under their control and so set up commissions to go around to the
subject cities and establish oligarchies in each one.
The oligal>chs held office only Wltil September. 20

But in

the spaoe of three months, they had managed to do sufficient
damage.

The new oligarchy which they had established on Samos

compromised the loyalty of that state for a time; but the Sami8,ns
18Abyd~9 and Lampsacu8 are treated in VIII,

62.

19For the coins of Abydus, confer Head, His tortt, 538-.539.
20The arrival of the Four Hundred in Athens is described 1n
VIII, 67 rf.

r
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themselves, ,who seemed to be the most faithful of' the .Athenian
allies throughout the fifth and even into the fourth century,
righted the governmental difficulties themsel ves.

For a time,

in fact, while the oligarchs were still in control of Athens and
attempting to make peace with the Spartans, the Athenian fleet
and the Samians considered themselves as the only true Ath{~nia.ns
and set up their own distinctive coinage--Athenian tetradrachms
with the head of Athena and with a small Samian bull's head in
front of the traditional owl on the reverse. 2l
Though Thucydldes makes no explicit mention of a revolt on
Thasos at this date, it might easily be inferred both from the
stability of the oligarchic government there even after the democratic restoration at Athens and from the new gold coinage 22 beginning in 411--an indication of friendship with the Persians. 23
A short ttm. later, Byzantium revolted again; and, from the
year 411, she began minting her well-known iron coins. 2q
Closer to home, an uprising on Euboea thoroughly frightened

21The difficulties at Samos are mentioned in VIII, 72.77;
Bury, 494; c. A. H. v, 333-334. Their coins are treated in
E. S. G. Robinson, ATe11 EI-Mashkute Hoard of Athenian Tetradrachma," The Numismatig Chron1cle, 6th Series, VI (1946-1947),
118~119, and Se1tman, 6ree~ Coins, 147-148.
22These were Thasos' first issues in r,old, despite her large
interests in the Pangaean mines.
23The difficulties at Thasos are troated in VIII,

64.

24ayzantium's revolt 1s merition.0d in VIII, 80; her c()inage
is treated 1n Head, ~., 263-268 and Poole, 93-105.
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the Athenians.

During the summer months they had already endured

difficul ties with Samos, Thasos, and Byzantium; and now the fact
that the large island directly to

~~e

by rebellion urged them to action.

north of Attica was menaoed

It was at this time that they

took definite steps towards a more stable government at horne, expelling the Four Hundred, reoalling Alciblades from exile, and
setting up a new demooratio constitution, frequently referred to
as the Constitution of Theral'llenes, which Thucydides praises
highly.25
The revolt on Euboea, however, was evid6ntly successful.
Begi~xing in

411, a series of federal coinage began at Eretria

which would continue down through the next oentury.26
After the Euboean affair, Thucydides ends his narrative
swiftly with two rays of hope for the Athenian cause.

Shortly

after this event, an Athenian fleet won a naval battle at Cynossema, whioh greatly raised the spirits of the people.27

Then

Cyzious, whioh had ventured to revolt also, was repressed and
fined. 28

Thus the historian closes his aocount of the fifth

25The history of Euboea is treated in VIII, 95-96; Bury, 495496; c. A. H., V, 338. The Constitution of Theramenes can be
dooumented In Aristotle's The Const!tution.2t: 2
Athenia.ns, XXIX-

XXXIII; it 1s mentioned by~ucydides in VIII, 97, 2. Confer also
Steve1l8o:r!, If'l~e Constitution of Theramenes, n :ll!§., LVI (1936),48-5'7.
':)'

~bThe coins of Euboea are described in Gardner, ~.,

Head, lQ~.,

355-357.

27Cynossema is treat~d in VIII,

341-342.
?8

247;

104-105; Bury, It96;Q.A.g.,V

"- 'Cyzicus 1s mentioned in VIII, 107. T'ne bri'ef freedom of
the city did not l"esult 1n any ooin chanp:e.
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century with two Athenian victories against the dim background
of a decaying Empire.
By way of brief summary of the evidence in thl s ch:1pter, we

might mention the following data.

The Syracusan expedition left

its mark on the coinage of Sicily: in the gold "necessi tylt money
and in the later sIlver commemorative coins of Syracuse ltself,
in the altered styles of the currency of Catana and Sst';esta.
The greater part of the long list of the allies in VII,
ve~ified

through a brief perusal of their coinage.

51 was

Decelela,

of course, had no immediate effect on Athenian money; but it
would a few years later, when the reserves on the Acropolis would
run out in

408/7.

Among the towns in revolt in 412 and 411, we coUld trace definite influences in the coinage of Ch10s, enidua, Cyme, .A.bydus,
Samos, Thasos, Byzantium, and Euboea.

Rhodes did not begin to

Issue untIl after a few years had passed.

Furthermore, resump-

tion in Cyme (and also in Ephesus) helps us to fill in Thucydldes'
account, which is probably quite selective in this description of
the disIntegration of the Empire.

And, while the evidence Is not

always as clear or as full as we might like it to be, still it
in no way contradicts the account of the historian.

CH#lPTER VI
THE VALIDITY OF' THUCYDIDES I ANALYSIS OF THE MORALITY O~~ THE
ATHElIIAN BMP IRE

aywv,

x't'T)(.ul 't'! eC; are ~ ll.aAAov 11
0i1a.
't'0 nQPa.xp~~a. «xoueav ~uyxe''t'a,.

ec;

We have

110W'

--Thucydides, I, 22, L~.
completed our discussion of the his tor:: of the

Athenian Empire as related by Thucydides and as reflected in
numislna tics .We therefore wish to return once aga.in to the
problem posed in chapter one and try to solve it in the light of
the historical evidence seen thus far.

In the present chapter,

then, we will attempt to answer three chief questions revolving
around our problem: (1) was Thucydides' approach to the Athenian
Empire completely objective or did his literary flair l~ad him to
omit certain facts which were historically pertinent; (2) in the
narratIVe does such historical necessity appear as would actually
force the Athenians to take the

COl~se

of action that they did

and hence validate their moral apologia; and (3) were the proposed
Athenian views on morals actually shared by Thucydides.

These

three main points will constitute the material of this chapter.
To a.nswer the first question on Thucyd:ldes' objectivity, we
need not spend much time in re-reviewing the history of the Ernpire.

We need only remnrk that in our present study we have in
or:;'

general uncovered a surprising amount of substantiation for
Thucydides' narrative.

We have been able to find numismatic

affirmation for roughly eif.hty-five percent of the incidents
mentioned by the historian; and many of the other events, such
as the assemblies at Sparta in 432 and the capture of small cities
like Plataea, ivere not likely to leave their mark upon coinage.
On the other hand, we nowhere ran across any contradiction between
Thucydides and co inage. except for a

8

eaming dlrrj.cul ty when

Melos' name appeared on the revised A.thenian tribute lists from

425.

Our main coneeI'n at this point is with those events that

numismatics has reI ated anel 1Ih ichI'hucydides has for some reason
or other omitted from his account.

Among such facts are the

capture of Lycia and Ep~esus in or around

469 and their revolt

around 413. the transfer of the Delian treasury to Athens in
the Decree of Clearchu8 in

449.

454.

the softening of the imperial

policy in the northern regions around 439. the greatly increased
tribute in

425,

and the revolt of Cyme in

412.

Why d 1d Thucydides le ave these events out of his narra ti ve?

We cannot. of course,

pen~trate

to his subjective reasoning in

this matter; bu t we must attempt to approximate his thoughts on
the subject.

We will never know for certain '.vh.etlJ.er the omissions

were intentional or not.

We must satisfy ourselves with stating

simply that he mip;ht he. ve or should have known about these facts
and the. t he might have or should have included them 1n his account.
Before attempting a subjective analysis. however, let us
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take a brief look at the omitted matter itself.

A certain

amount of it can be designated as irrelevant before we begin
our inquiry.

The gain and loss of Lycia and Ephesus in the

fifth oentury- would hardly be considered of first-rate strategio
importance, and Thucydides should not be expeoted to include the
acquisition of every city in his narrative.

But it may be argued

that he mentions the capture of Eion, Scy-ros, and Carystus just
before the original date of the fall of Ephesus.

These cities,

however, were brought into the narrative for a special reason-not because of their own relative importance, but because of
their significance as steps in the transition from confederacy
to empire, the first steps in an ever-changing policy- of the Athenians.
Bor similarly would the revolt of C;yme be of major importance.
And actually-, as noted above on p_ge

90, we oannot say that Thucy-

dide. entirely neglects the fall of Cyme, since he definitely
implies it in a later passage.

Also, the changing of the im-

perial polioy in the Tbraoian area in

439

was not widespread in

its effects) the right of coinage was probably restored to less
than ten cities (we know of four).

The historian could scarcely

be blamed tor leaving out events like these.
But the other three omissions are not a8 easy to explain
away, because ot their relative importanoe.
treasury, the decree of

449,

The transfer of the

and the sweeping alterations in the

tribute .ere signifioant events in the history of the EmpIre.

'Why should Thucydides choose to neglect them?

A variety of

answers could be proposed, some of which we have already seen.
Vlere the events in

th~mselves

too well known so that a re-

tellinp: of them would seem almost banal?
rule

This is highly doubt-

Thllcydides does not fail to recount other well-known in-

cidents,as the rJolian attack and the steee of Syracuse.

A his-

torian is not incl ined to oni t an e vent because it is too important.

The most obvious answer to tho problem is the one that
Cornford and his associates prefer, namely that Thucydides
leaves these events out because they do not fit in with his proposed scheme--a eulogy of Athena' former greatness.
any man who was trying to

cove~

Yet would

up Borne of the more savory de-

tails of his country's past go to the trouble of relating the
many massacres and depopulations perpetrated by his nation?
Would he allow the leading states,man of his land and the chief
founder of the Empire to refer baldly to that institution as
"tyranny,,?l

Would he portray such inhumane and uncivilized

passions in his glorious people as he puts into the mouths o.f
tho Athenian spokesmen in the eel ebrated Melian d ialor:ue?2

A

man attempting to enlist the sympath1es of his hearers for t:1S
Empire would hardly enliven his narrative with these choice

lConfer note

1, page 1.

2Confer F. Wassermann, ttThe Melian Dialogue, II Transaotions .2;
the American Philological Association, LXXVIII (1947), 18-36.
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morsels.
Or perhaps we might say in answer to our question on these
omissions that Thueydides' critical sense was deficient.

It is

qu i te plaus i ble tha t a. man who exercised good .1udr:ment in mas t
cases should err 1n some few, that he should fail to see the relative significance of an occas10nal recent occurrence.
This answer 1s possible, but I believe tha.t another is
slightly more probable.

If we look once more at the three events

left out of Thucydides' acoount, we cannot help noticing that
they are all of a type: the transfer of the treasury, a decree
touohing chiefly on the issue of currency, and a statement of incoming revenues.

The very fact that all these omissions touch

on money in same form or other, as

ml~ht

be suspected from the

nature of our previous inquiry in chapters two through five,
might give us a clue to their absenoe.

I say a clue beoause I

do not believe, as Sutherland suggests,) that Thucydldes'is oblivious of all financial happenings or motives.

T'hucydides pro-

bably omitted them because he felt that his was a primarily military history and that these particular events did not have any
bearing on the military; but this answer is not entirely satisfactory.

Thucydides at times pays much attention to other

small finano1al deta1ls 4 wh10h had even less military relevance

30. B. V. Sutherland, "Corn and COin, Ill. Note on Greek Commeroial Monopolies, It Amer1 o.~n Journal £t Philolorul, LXIV (19+3),146.
4Confer Appendix I.
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than tMse. S

We must, unfortunately, content ourselves with this attempt
at solution.

We can at best surmise Thucydtdes' subjective

reasona, and it 1s better in such caS6S not to indulge in literary fantasles in attempting to describe a further resolut1on
than that w8,l'lranted by the evidence.

We may safely Bay that the

historian might have been more accurate, had he set down theae

events, and

he undoubtedly knew them, as would any Athenian citi-

zen who oould read the atone tablets set up on the Acropolis.
But I hardly believe that .e would be justified in saying that
he omitted them because they dId not fit In with his preconceived

apologetic notions.
Oan .e make any defin1te conclusions from our present study?
CertaInly eight y-f l' ve· percent IUbstantiation from a non-literary

f1eld would ••em to lndicate something.

Yet it does not say that

s,,1th regard to thelle omissions, Gomme 1n his oommentary
8.,8
(I 370) tha t the trans tel' r the tre.sury .... "a measure
which moft clearly thafl any other marked the ohange from the slm0

J

to the :rule, apx~, of Athena over tbe
Yet he orfe-r8 no explanatlon for '!'huc,.d1d •• ' enaaloD, except that it 18 con.iatoent wi th the method
1n the reat or the work--an unlikely solution, sinoe Thucydldes
f'ltequent17 made .nt10n or smallex- financial details.
Gonmte alao calla 'l'hucyd1des' neglect or the trIbute chang.s
1n 42> "tm.e .tl'ange8t of all amissiona 1n 1hucydid••• " (III, ,$00)
But he thinks that this omission may be due to the fact that
'rhuc1dld•• had not returned to Athena between the t1me of the
ohanges and his exlle the next ,.ear and may not have been able to
obtam any exact figure ••
This solution, howev8-r, seems inadequate to me. If Thuc:rdides waa camposing hi. work atter 404--and 1t seems evident
tt-Om the tut cited .a:rller that he was--then he would have had
ace••• to a~ such recorda at Athena.
the dIfficulty remains.
pIe leader.hip,

rrrE(.l.OY&a,

membera of the leagus."

.0
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Thucydides 1s infallible, simply because we have

~~n

across no

unresolvable conflict between our two lines of evidence.

Our

conclusion should lIe somewhere in the middl a, but, because of
the rela ti vely high percentage, more towards the side of his objectivity.

It would not be an entirely unfounded supposition

were we to state as a result of this excursus that Thucydldes
was obj ecti ve in discussing mos t of the circumstances surrounding
the question of the Athenian Empire.

We would not wish to canon-

ize the historian, however; for he is by no means perfect.
has been known to omit pertinent data.

He

He has made decided mis-

takes. 6 And he at times takes little pains to conceal his unqualified

admi~ation

for such men as Pericles.

But he is, by

and large, objective; and, consequently, we can safely and reason
ably answer our first ques tioll in the affirma ti va.

'l~lUcydides

was fundamentally a sound historian, and his literary urge did
not run away with h1m.
The answer to our second quos tion, namely that regarding 'the
necessity in the circumstances attendant on the origin, growth,
and continuance of the empire, need not detain us long.

As we

have previously seen in the i'irst chapter, the type of necessity
that th., Athenian envoys at Sparta. were talking about was scarcely necessity in the strict sanse of an unalterable extrinsic
determination to one course of action.

It was rather pragmatic

6E• g ., with regard to the geography of Sphacteria.
Gomme 's cornman tary, III, h84.

Confer

r
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neoessity or expedienoy, a compulsion induoed by motives of fear,
honor, and self-interest.

This expediency was obviously pre-

sent throughout the history of tile Athenian Empire.

It was to

the advantaee of the Athenians to assume the proffered leadership
at the beginning of the oonfedsraoy in

478/7.

They certainly

profited by the military aot1 vi ties of the confederacy, sharing
in the spoils alonR with the.tr fellow members.

It was to their

interest to l{eep possible insubordinates in line and to retain
their firm hold on the mole confederacy; hence it was deoidedly
exp~dient

to punish

seve~~

such would-be secessionists as the

Naxians and the Thasians.
We could review the history of the Empire at I ength and in
great detail, pointing out :tn each event what was to the advantage
of the Athenians.

Once they possessed their Empire and even the

shadow of a Dolian confederacy was at an end, they had aroused
t.1-).e ire of many of their subjects; and they were afraid" to let
go, as Perioles and the Athenian envoys at Sparta admitted.
This was their necessity.

It was present throughout the career

of' the Empl1re, gui ding the hand of the Athenians, directing them
in whatever course of action was to their advantage.

We may be

misled by the terminology, since expediency hardly seems philosophical necessity to us.
expressed

e.::r eady

But, granted the positivist morality

in chapter one as a foundation for the apologia

of the Athenians, we cannot gainsay their excuses for tyranny
wlt~out

entering into the philosophical realm and proceeding be-
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yond the scope of our thesis.

llaturally the AthenIans conducted

their affairs of government to their own pragrn..atic advantage,
sinoe many of tl16m no longer believed In any other standard of
'1lOrallty.

The expediency wh:!.ch

;~ulded

them

was, of cQurse, pre-

sent in the historical e vents; and these h.1."Joorieal events were

faltllfully related by Thucydfdes.

And so presclnding fram the

Athenian deterministio theory of morals, we must pass on their
apolor1a as valid.
whllt drove thom

The

exped~,ency 0];1

necessIty of history was

to take the course of' action which they did.

One !'!lore question 1'enBins to be answered.

Did Thucydi.des

agree wi t 1" the moral criteria the. t !le put into t:be

his contemporary Athenians?
that~.ls

speec~es

of

Is the determin1stic moral analysis

hismrically valid actually his own?

Let us quote a well-kno',m pa.ssage from the ttl lrd bool:: o.f
his history.

He ia here rf~f6rring to tho difficulties in Corcyra

In 427 B.C •• and his referenc*,s to the n code of human rtf ture lt
are hardly complImentary.

At this cris1s, when th~ life of the oity ha.d been thrown
into utter oonfUsion, human nature, now trlQ~ph~~t over
the laws, and accustomed even in sp1te of the laws to do
wrong, took deli,C!h t in showing that its pass10ns wero ungovernable, that it was stronger than justice and an
enemy to all superiority. POl" surely no man would have
put revenge before relif?1on, and gain before innocence
of wrong, had not envy swayed him with her blighting
power. Indeed, '!!len do not hesl tate, when they s~ek to
avenge themselves UP-)rl others, to abrogate in ad~,m.nce
the common princ1ples observed ~,n suoh c9.ses--t!'lOse
principles upon which depends overy 1?tan' sown ;'lOpa of
sal vat ion should he hlm..'H,lf be overtaken by misfortune-thus failing to leave them in force at~ainst the t:tme
when perchance a nq,n in peril shall have need of soml')

104
one of them. 7

We would base our whole argument on this citation. extolling as
it does the laws of religion and universal char:i.ty.

But. un-

happily textual difficulties enter into consideration here.
Nearly all recent critical texts reject this chapter of the
third book as spurious, and scholiast traditions

~oinG

back as

far as Dionysius of Hallcarnassus support this contention.
fice it to say that some modern commentators,

e.g.

Suf-

SCJ;1wartz and

Adcock,8 have accepted the passage; and we wis''led to clte it
here as a point from which to begin our brief argumentat1.on on
this matter, rather than as an authority in itself.
Instead we shall base our conclusions on '1'hucydides' views
of morality on a number of other texts, all of which are safe
critically.

Beginning with the eighty-second and eighty-third

chapters of the third book, which immediately precede the passage
quoted above, we find much of the same flavor of commentary upon
the war morals of the time.

l'hucydides descries the s piri t of

revenR6 and dace! t a.broad in the c1 ty at war; he r ef'ers to
greed and ambition as the cause of

t..~ese

evils.

He bewails the

prevalent depravity, the loss of simplicity, which he regards as
"the chief element of a noble nature,tt9 and the broken oaths of

711I,

84, 2-3.

80lted in Gamme, II, 3q3.
9111, 8), 1.

10$
stat.smen.

Though he 1s explicitly declaiming only on the

savagery evident in a city during internal dissension, he implies
that these observations belong to all states and individuals in
time of war. 10
We have frequently adverted to the Melian dialogue, that
forthright expression of an overweening imperial power.

The

Athenian speeches throughout this section of the history are
couched in terms which le_ve an unmistakable impression of pride
and brutality.

They offer the Melians the alternative of becom-

ing imperial subjects of their own accord or of meeting the1r
death under overwhelming force..

And, as sole excuse for this

barbarous conduct, the Athenians allege,nFor of the gods we hold
the beliet, and of men .e know, tnat by a nece.sity ot their
nature wherever they have power they always rule."ll

And so,

presuming on future divine tavor in spite of their m18deed.,12
the Athenian. go down to disaster 10 the Syracuaan
, exped1tion,
which beg1ns in the very next chapter after the cloae ot the
Melian episode.
We might say that such orude sentiment. seem to be attributed espeoially to the member. of the war party at Athens.
through the fourth and fifth booka, Cleon, the leader of this

lOllI, 82, 3.
11y, 105, 2.
12y , 10$, 1.

All
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party, Is portrayed as a vulgar demagogue and an unscrupulous
agItator.

Then, after his death at Amphipolis, the war party

succeeds in violating the truce by attacking Meloa in 416 and expressing their contemptuous sentiments as above.

FInally, in

the sixth book, It is likewise this party, with Alcibiades as
prime mover, who convinoes the Athenian people of the wisdom
of the Sicilian expedition, which finally weakened the power of
Athena

.0 seriously that her Aegean subjects

could revolt almost

with impunl ty •
On the other hand, IUcias, the leader of the peace party,

1. generally painted aa a vlrtuous man, though a somewhat lrreaolute general.

He tighta doggedly to forestall the sending of

the fleet to Sicl1y; and, when eventually he loae. his life In
that oampaign, he ia mourned by Tbuoydides as va man who, of all
the aellene. of my time, least d.served to me.t with such a

ca~

lamity, because ot hla oour.e ot lit. that had been wholly regulated inaooordanee with virtue."l)

And, as Thuoydides himself,

admits, .icias' virtue •• eem hardly to have been military in
charaoter.
On these considerations as well aa on those of language employed at other places in the narrative, e.g., when the historian
r.fers to the suppression of the revolt of Naxos as being terminated x~pd ~& X4e£a~~x&' 'OOUA~~ (soarcely oomplimentary terma),
l)VII, 86, $.
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I would say that Tbucydides t sympathies did not lie with the new
Throughout his work he gives the Athenian

agg~essive mo~ality.

ca.e a fair hearing, but I do not believe that he agreed with
them in principle.

Despite his objective

morality, he seems to have

preter~ed

po~trayal

of the new

the old religious standards.

In conclusion, let us make a few remarks on the significance
of this thesis.

We do not propose to claim that we have settled

without a doubt the problems discussed in the course of these
chapters.

It would

r.qu1~e

a doctorate dissertation, for instance

to delve fully into such topics as the deterministic

mo~ality

or

the necessitarian theory of history in the pages of Thucydides;
and we have just touched lightly on these questions wherever it
has been

neceDsa~

to

b~ing

them into

ou~

discussion.

But our

contact with the non-literary science of numismatics has allowed
us to become reasonably sure of Thucydides' objectivity in dealing wi th the history of the Athenian Empire, in so far a'. external
evidence can tell the story.

Our very slight contact with the

positivist moral philosophy of the Athenian war party has led us
to appreciate their attempted defense of their position on the
grounds of historical neceSSity.

And, finally, we have caught a

faint glimpse into mind of Thucydides himself on t his whole question of morality and history and have seen that his personal
views on the matter, while not prejudicing his objective account
of the Athenian pride and
old

~eligious

~uin,

seem to lie on the side of the

standards of virtue.

But it would be foolish to
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cla1m that we have settled these questions beyond the shadow of
a doubt.

We but point out general tendencies Which we think are

significant and keep an open mind for the ever-increasing evidenoe which scholarship is building up in classical fields.
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APPENDIX I
THUCYDIDES' INTEREST IN FINANCIAL QUESTIONS
This appendix 1s not intended to be a polemio.

I do not

propose to refute Professor Sutherland's views l on Thucydides'
orass neglect of oommercial motives in the Peloponnesian War.
I wish merely to state positively certain aspects under which
the historian brings up finanoial matters and to recount briefly some ot his more oharacteristic statements on the subjeot.
Thus this appendix will not be a complete oatalogue of all the
instanoes in which Thucydides mentioned anything conneoted with
moneYJ nor will it be a damnation of previous opinions on the
subject.

It will serve simply as a faint indioation that the

historian was not entirely ignorant of the important par,t tha t
finance pI ays in the waging

0

r any war.

In the quotation from Thucydides cited at the beginning ot
ohapter four, we found Archidamus, the aged Spartan king, saying,
"War i. not so muoh a matter of arms as or money • • • • "2

And,

throughout the pages of the history, we find this statement reeohoed countless times.

The Trojan war was insignifioant, com-

lConrer page 99.

2Page S8; I, 83, 2.
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pared with the Pe1oponnesian War, "because of lack of money."3
Similarly the conflict beginning in 432 was destined to be so
great because both Sparta and Athens and their respective allies
were at the height of their power, though Thucydides carefully
distinguishes between the relative poverty of Sparta financially
and the fiscal reserve built up by the Athenians
system of tribute.4

throu~~

their

Pericles remarks that "it is accumulated

wealth • • • that sustains wars."5

And, for these reasons, the

Athenians should have been able to overcome the Spartans.
During the account of the war itself, both sides see that
the success of the Athenian cause depends upon the revenues
coming regularly from the subject cities of the Empire, as well
as trom Athens' own silver mines at Laurium. 6

To stop this flow

of money, the Spartans fortify Deceleia in 413 and succeed in
impoverishing Athens to some extent by cutting off her native
supply ot si1ver. 7

In the olosing year8 ot the narrative, the

Spartans make a treaty with the Persians; and one ot the express
purposes of the paot is to prevent the tribute money from reaohr1

ing Athens.~·

These taotics are eventuallY successful and help

31, 11, 2.

41, 19; I, 80,
51, 141, .5.

4;

I, 85, 1; I, 141, 2-4; I, 142, 1.

6II, 13, 2J VII, 19, 1.
7VII, 27, 3-5
SVIII, lA, 1.

and

28,

4.
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considerably toward the downfall of the city at a later date.
As the power of Sparta grows in the years narrated by the
eighth book, her resources grow as well.

She begins to levy

tribute from her followers for the prosecution ot' the war, even

If they are unwilling. 9 And she is soon enriched by assessments
whieh seem to exceed even those of Athens in her prime. lO
Throughout the course of the war, the historian frequently
remarks on the relative wealth or poverty of a city.

He describes
the destitution of the Syracusans under siege at some length. ll

He refers to the opUlence of Selinus and Syraouse before the beginning ot the Sioilian campaign. 12 The concealed poverty of
Segesta l ) 1. one of the main t'actors which leads to the vanquishment ot' the Athenian forces In the West.

And, at various times,

he mentions the wealth of suoh peoples as the Carthaginians,14
the Odrysl&ns,15 and the colonists at Amphipolis. l6
Partl cular sums ot' money are recorded over twenty t'imes in

9vIII, ), 1-2.
10VIII,
Rhodes.

44, 4,

llVII, 48,

5.

l2 VI , 20,

4.

13VI, 46,
14vI, 34,

1.
2.

15 I1 , 91, ).

16rv , 108, 1.

where thirty-two talents are taken from
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~he narrative.

For example, Thucydides tells us that the first

.ssessed tribute of the Delian confederacy amounted to 460 talents.17

Then he gives in detail the financial condition of the

~thenian

treasury in 431, where be lists reserves amounting to

6000 talents in coined silver an.d numerous other sources of precious meta.ls, such as the temple vessels and the plates on the
statue of Athena, on the Acropolis. 18 He notes that 1000 talents
of this monGY was later set aside as an emergency fund.

19 Occa-

siona.lly too, he gives us exact figures on such events as the
siege of Potidaea, which COlt 2000 talents. 20 or the property

tax of 428, which netted 200 talents. 21

Tiny iterna of interest

are also recorded at times, such as when Brasidas otters thirty
silver mnas to the first man to soal. the wall of Leoythus

22

or

when the Argive.amss a popular profIt of twenty-five talents
from selling the booty taken from the Spartans at Thyreatis. 23
We have already mentioned the heavy reliance of th~ Athenians
upon the tribute.

Thuoydides disousses the Athenian tribute

96. 2.
1811 • 13, 3-5.
1911. 24, 1. The emergenoy came in VIII, 15, 1.
171,

20 1 I, 70, 2.
21 III, 19. 1.

22IV, 116, 2.
23 VI, 95, 1.
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policy in the first book and tells how the main aim of the imperial city is to reduce all their allies to dependent, tributepaying subjects.24

Sometimes he descends to s~ch homely details

as the ships which sailed around collecting the trlbute. 25
Nor does he neglect the financial status of the. indIvidual.
He refers to his own right towor¥ the gold mines near Amphipo-

li8. 26

He mentions the great personal wealth of Nicias and the

Corinthians' fear that he will bribe his way fre~.27

In several

instances he tells us that the pay for the average soldier or
sailor in Athenian employ was one drachma daily, Which was twice
the salary of a contemporary juror in the Athenian law courts. 28
He states that the average amount necessary to maintain a warship for a month was one talent. 29

And at least twice he cites

the exact amount levied by fine: ten

tho~and

drachmas against

King Agis, the Unsuccessful Spartan general,3 0 and two thousand
mnas demanded from the Lacedaemonians for violating Eli.
an Olympic truce.31

241, 96,1; I, 99. 3.
2$ IV , 7$.

26 IV , 10$, 1.
27VII, 86, 4.
28 111, 17, 2) VI, 31, li VII, 27, 1-2.
29vI, 8, 1.
JOy, 6), 2.
31v, 49, 1.
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'l'hucydldes even mentions differont standards of' m.oney.

IIe

relates a quarrel between the Persians and the Spartans as to
whether the Peloponnesian sailors should be paid one Attic
drachma per day.3 2

Corinth asks her citizens who wish to make

a deposit for one of her colonies, but do not wish to go in person to make a down payment of fifty Corinthian drachmas--hardly
a surprising standard. 33

The Athen1ans are said to have purchase

Rhoeteum, a city in Asia Minor, for two thousand Phocaean staters
from the Mitylenian exiles. 34 And the Chians pay the members of
the Spartan fleet which have assisted them three Chian tessaracosts per man. 3.?
Except for the general statements with regard to the 1mportanoe of money towards the war effort, many of these citations
from Thucydides have little or no significance in themselves.
But they do serve to show that the historian was not entirely
oblivious of money matters and that, although he may haNe omitted
financial facta from his narrative in which we would be

mu~~

more

interested, this was not done because he had ruled the Whole subject of money out of his history.

And it is only fair to Thuey-

dides to remark in conclusion that many more sundry

ex~~ples

of

financial events could be quoted from the pages of his account.

32VI11, 2.9, 1.
331, 27, 1.
34 IV, 52, 3.
35v111, 101, 1.
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